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A LITTLE "RIGHT" MUSICK: THE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL JUDICIAL CREATION OF
PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION UNDER SECTION
10(b) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT
MICHAEL J. KAUFMAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
Securities litigators' and scholars2 are virtually obsessed with the private
* Associate Professor, Loyola University of Chicago Law School. A.B. Kenyon College (1980);
J.D. 1983, University of Michigan (1983). I wish to thank Lawrence Marshall and Julie Fenton for their
invaluable insights; Briggetta Von Weis, Christina Brotto and Colby Green for their helpful research;
the members of the Securities Law Section of the Chicago and American Bar Associations and the
participants in the Loyola University Law School Works in Progress Seminar for their perceptive
reactions to presentations of earlier versions of this Article; and the Loyola University Department of
Research Services for its financial support.
1. More civil actions have been filed under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
than under any other provision of the federal securities laws. ALFRED F. CONARD, ET AL., ENTERPRISE
ORGANIZATION 991 (3d ed. 1982) ("Since the first civil action sired by Rule lOb-5 pecked its way out
of the eggshell in 1947, its progeny have multiplied to become the most litigated segment of the SEC's
jurisdiction.").
2. More scholarship has been devoted to the private right of action for violations of section 10(b)
than to any other securities law issue. The quantity of the scholarship devoted to section 10(b) is
manifest by the attention given just to the issue of the implied right of action. See, e.g., Roy L. Brooks,
Rule lob-5 in the Balance: An Analysis of the Supreme Court's Policy Perspective, 32 HASTINGS L.J.
403 (1980); Alfred F. Conard, Securities Regulation in the Burger Court, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 193
(1985); Tamar Frankel, Implied Rights of Action, 67 VA. L. REV. 553 (1981); Thomas L. Hazen,
Implied Private Remedies Under Federal Statutes: Neither a Death Knell Nor a Moratorium-Civil
Rights, Securities Regulation, and Beyond, 33 VAND. L. REV. 1333 (1980); John A. Maher & Joan
Dawley Maher, Statutorily Implied Federal Causes of Action After Merrill Lynch: How Sad It Is; How
Simple It Could Be, 88 DICK. L. REv. 593 (1984); John A. Maher, Implied Private Rights ofAction and
the Federal Securities Laws: A Historical Perspective, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 783 (1980); William
F. Schneider, Implying Private Rights and Remedies Under the Federal Securities Acts, 62 N.C. L. REv.
853 (1984); Marc I. Steinberg, The Propriety and Scope of Cumulative Remedies Under the Federal
Securities Laws, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 557 (1982); Marc I. Steinberg, Implied Private Rights ofAction,
Under Federal Law, 55 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 33 (1979). Section 10(b) itself is the subject of multi-
volume treatises. See ALAN R. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW FRAUD, SEC RULE lOb-5 (1977);
ARNOLD S. JACOBS, LITIGATION AND PRACTICE UNDER RULE lOb-5 (1981). Despite the quantity of
this scholarship devoted to the section 10(b) implied private right of action, none of it addresses the
constitutional legitimacy of the judicial creation of a private remedy based on federal court remedial
power or legislative acquiescence.
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right of action under section 10(b) 3 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(the 1934 Act)4 and Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 1Ob-5.'
Since its inception in 1946,6 the judicially-created private remedy7 for
violations of section 10(b) has become a significant supplement to the
SEC's effort to enforce the federal securities laws8 and has become an
important source of compensation for defrauded securities investors.9 The
United States Supreme Court has "repeatedly reaffirmed"'0 the private
remedy, declaring its existence to be "well-established"" and "simply
beyond peradventure."' 2
Despite its undeniable appeal to litigators, academics, regulators and
federal judges, however, the propriety of the judicially-created section 10(b)
private right of action is still not beyond peradventure. Although the
Supreme Court has recognized or assumed the existence of the private
3. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988). Section 10 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 makes it
"unlawful for any person ... (b) [t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security... any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for
the protection of investors." Id.
4. 15 U.S.C. § 78a-7811 (1938).
5. 17 C.F.R § 240.10b-5 (1993). Rule lOb-5 provides:
Employment of manipulative and deceptive devices. It shall be unlawful for any person,
directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or
of the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange, (a) To employ any device,
scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit
to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in any act,
practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any
person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
6. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
7. Throughout this Article, the private right of action for monetary relief caused by violations of
section 10(b) and Rule lob-5 is variously termed a "private right of action," a "private cause of action"
or a "private remedy." For purposes of the issues addressed in this Article, the differences in label have
no significance.
8. Pursuant to its authority under section 10(b), the SEC in 1942 promulgated Rule lOb-S. 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1993). Because the scope of Rule lOb-5 can be no broader than the scope of
section 10(b), see Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 213 (1976), this Article generally refers
to section 10(b) without also referring to Rule lob-5.
9. See, e.g., Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 113 S. Ct. 2085, 2088
(1993); Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230-31 (1988). See also To Establish a Statute of
Limitations for Private Rights of Action Arising from a Violation of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934: Hearings on S. 1533, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
10. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 n.10 (1983) (citing Superintendent of
Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971)).
11. Huddleston, 459 U.S. at 380 n.10 (citing Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196
(1976)).
12. Huddleston, 459 U.S. at 380. See also Basic, 485 U.S. at 230-31.
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remedy, 3 that Court never has squarely held that such a remedy does, or
should, exist. Moreover, in not one of its cases interpreting the elements
of section 10(b) liability has the Supreme Court been required to reach the
issue whether the private right of action for violations of section 10(b)
arises under federal law for purposes of affording the federal district courts
subject matter jurisdiction over that action. 4
Because the Supreme Court has never directly addressed the existence
of the section 10(b) private remedy, the Court has never constructed a
reasoned argument supporting its constitutional propriety. In the course of
defining the elements of section 10(b) liability, however, the Court has
casually suggested two alternative justifications for the judicially-created
private remedy: the federal courts' remedial power to create private
remedies for the violation of a federal statute 5 or congressional acquies-
cence in federal court recognition of the private remedy. 6
Yet, the Court has rejected each of these justifications. The Court has
characterized arguments for the creation of a private right of action based
on the federal judicial power to remedy violations of the federal securities
laws as "entirely misplaced."' 7 At the same time, the Court has stated that
it would have "trouble inferring" congressional acquiescence in the federal
court creation of private securities law remedies." The Court's dissatis-
faction with the justifications for the judicial creation of private remedies
has led some of its members to insist that such remedies should never be
created.9 Other justices have begun to hint that even the well-established
13. See Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 196; Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730
(1975).
14. See discussion infra part II. See also Kardon, 69 F. Supp. at 512-13.
15. Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 113 S. Ct. 2085, 2088 (1993) (citing
Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 730, 737). In the portion of Blue Chip Stamps cited in Musick, the
Court relies on the federal remedial power to create private remedies for the violation of the securities
laws in order to "supplement" SEC actions. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 730 (quoting J.I. Case Co.
v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964)).
16. Musick, 113 S. Ct. at 2088; Huddleston, 459 U.S. at 384; Basic, 485 U.S. at 230-31.
17. Touche Ross Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560,568 (1979) (rejecting arguments for the creation
of a private right of action for violation of the reporting requirements of section 17(a) of the 1934 Act,
15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1988)).
18. Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, I11 S. Ct. 2749,2764 (1991) (rejecting a congressional
acquiescence argument for extending section 14(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 780(a) (1988)).
19. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773,2783 (1991) (Scalia,
J., concurring) (citing Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174. 190 (1980); Cannon v. University of
Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 730-49 (1979)).
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section 10(b) private remedy may be ripe for reconsideration."
This Article engages in that reconsideration and offers a constitutional
argument for the elimination of the judicially-created private right of action
under section 10(b). Part II confronts and overcomes stare decisis barriers
to the judicial reconsideration of section 10(b). Ultimately, the Supreme
Court should address the legitimacy of the section 10(b) private right of
action because federal court recognition of that right of action is unconsti-
tutional.
Part III of this Article illustrates that the arguments supporting the
judicial creation of the section 10(b) private right of action cannot survive
serious constitutional scrutiny. If the section 10(b) private remedy is rooted
in federal court remedial power, then it represents the unconstitutional
exercise by the federal courts of the power to make law and to expand their
own subject matter jurisdiction. If that remedy instead is based on notions
of congressional acquiescence, then it represents an unconstitutional judicial
usurpation of legislative power.
Part IV contends that the Supreme Court's opinions interpreting section
10(b) display the unfortunate consequences of the unconstitutional exercise
of judicial power. Devoid of any legislative guidance for its decisions
interpreting the section 10(b) implied private remedy, the Supreme Court
has issued opinions which are driven by the Court's express distaste for the
private remedy itself and by the Court's desire to protect defendants from
its reach. Part V addresses the Supreme Court's recent decision in Musick,
Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Trust Insurance of Wausau,2 and argues
that the Court's recognition of an implied section 10(b) right to contribution
only compounds the constitutional maladies of the remedy's underpinnings.
Finally, Part VI concludes by predicting the effect of eliminating the
section 10(b) implied right of action. Congress likely will respond to the
absence of the implied right of action by legislating an express remedy for
violations of section 10(b). Even if Congress does not act, however, the
cost to those victims of securities fraud who would no longer be able to
obtain monetary relief under section 10(b) is relatively small compared to
the benefits of constitutional compliance.
20. Musick, 113 S. Ct. at 2092 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("We again have no cause to reconsider
whether the lOb-5 action should have been recognized at all.'). Justice Thomas was joined in his
dissenting opinion by Justices Blackmun and O'Connor. See also Virginia Bankshares, 111 . Ct. at
2764 n.I I ("The object of our inquiry does not extend firther to question the holding of... J.1. Case
Co. v. Borak... at this date.') (emphasis added).
21. 113 S. Ct. 2085 (1993).
[VOL. 72:287
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II. THE ROLE OF STARE DECISIS IN THE JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF
THE SECTION 10(b) PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION
The principle of stare decisis directs the Supreme Court to afford some
deference to its previous decisions.22 That principle, however, does not
preclude the Court from reaching the merits of the issue whether the federal
courts have the power to create a private right of action under section 10(b)
because: (1) the Supreme Court never has formally held that such a private
right of action exists; (2) even if the Supreme Court decisions are
considered statutory precedents interpreting section 10(b) to create a private
remedy, they are not protected by a rule of statutory stare decisis; and (3)
the unconstitutionality of the judicial creation and maintenance of that
private remedy justifies the reconsideration of any precedent supporting the
remedy.
The Supreme Court is not bound by stare decisis to maintain the private
section 10(b) remedy because there is no prior Supreme Court decision
establishing the remedy. The principle of stare decisis, even in its strongest
form, only binds the Supreme Court to follow its own precedents. 23 But
the Supreme Court has never held that the federal courts have the power
to create a private remedy for violations of section 10(b).24 Instead, the
Supreme Court merely has expressly acquiesced in the lower federal court
recognition of that remedy.' Certainly, the Court has assumed the
existence of the private remedy for purposes of interpreting elements of
state of mind,26  standing,27  deception,2  exclusivity,29  materiality,3
0
22. Compare Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) (refusing to overrule
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1989)) with Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express,
Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (overruling Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953)) and Gulfstream Aerospace
Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 108 S. Ct. 1133 (1988) (overruling Enelow v. New York Life Ins. Co., 293
U.S. 379 (1935)). See also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.L
1361, 1427-29 (1988); Charles J. Cooper, Stare Decisis: Precedent and Principle in Constitutional
Adjudication, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 401 (1988); Frank H. Easterbrook, Stability and Reliability in
Judicial Decisions, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 422 (1988).
23. Seegenerally PETER WESLEY-SMITH, THEORIES OF ADJUDICATION AND THE STATUS OF STARE
DEcisIS, PRECEDENT IN LAW 81-82 (Goldstein ed. 1987); Eskridge, supra note 22, at 1364-1391; James
W. Moore & Robert S. Oglesbay, The Supreme Court, Stare Decisis and the Law of the Case, 21 TEX.
L. REV. 514, 523-25 (1943).
24. See, e.g., Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty, Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
25. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975).
26. Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
27. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 730.
28. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 196.
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reliance,31 the statute of limitations,32 and contribution.33  In not one of
those cases, however, did the Supreme Court actually hold, much less
expressly reason to the conclusion, that the federal court creation of the
private section 10(b) remedy was proper.34
Perhaps more significant, however, is that the Supreme Court has never
been required to reach the issue whether the section 10(b) remedy arises
under federal law for purposes of providing an independent basis for
subject matter jurisdiction in the federal district courts.35 In some of its
decisions addressing the section 10(b) remedy, the Supreme Court has held
that no section 10(b) private right of action exists for the plaintiffs'
claims.36 In all of the remaining cases, the plaintiffs asserted a basis for
federal jurisdiction independent of those claims.37 The federal courts had
29. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 387 (1983).
30. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
31. Id.
32. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773 (1991).
33. Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Trust Ins. of Wausau, 113 S. Ct. 2085 (1993).
34. By contrast, see Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (carefully reasoning
to the holding that a private cause of action exists under Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972).
35. Because the federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, see U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, there
must be an independent jurisdictional basis for each claim filed in federal court. See, e.g., American
Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17-18 (1951). Exercising its exclusive power to create the
federal district courts, Congress has assigned to those courts original jurisdiction over claims "arising
under" federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988).
36. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (finding no private right
of action for offerees of stock who neither purchased nor sold securities); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 185 (1976) (asserting that no private right of action will "lie" for negligence); Santa Fe Indus.
v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (no private right of action for corporate mismanagement); Lampf, Pleva,
Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773 (1991) (finding no private right of action
if filed more than three years after the challenged transaction or one year from discovery).
37. See Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 113 S. Ct. 2085 (1993)
(recognizing that initial claims brought under sections 11 and 12 of the 1933 Act, afforded supplemental
jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, for the "related" section 10(b) contribution claim); Bateman, Eichler,
Hill Richards, Inc. v. Bemer, 472 U.S. 299 (1985) (finding section 10(b) claims supplemental to other
expressed federal claims, including under the 1933 Act); Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S.
375 (1983) (assuming the existence of cumulative remedies under section 11 of the 1933 Act, affording
supplemental jurisdiction for the "related" section 10(b) claims, 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1988)); Affiliated
Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972) (recognizing jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)
as the United States was a party-defendant); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404
U.S. 6 (1971) (recognizing that because plaintiffs claims under the express liability provisions of the
Securities Act of 1933, provided the federal court with "supplemental" jurisdiction over the "related"
section 10(b) claims, 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1988)). But see Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988)
(defining materiality and finding appropriate the lower court's certification ofa class based on rebuttable
presumption of reliance, provided that class is adjusted on remand as circumstances demand).
[VOL. 72:287
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subject matter jurisdiction over the section 10(b) claims, therefore, based
upon the doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction.3" Consequently, the
Supreme Court has never reached the issue whether a private right of action
under section 10(b) is a claim "arising under" federal law which would
afford independent federal question jurisdiction for that action.39
Even if the Supreme Court's section 10(b) decisions were considered
precedents interpreting that section to create private remedies, the doctrine
of statutory stare decisis would not preclude the Court from reconsidering
those precedents. The principle of statutory stare decisis directs the
Supreme Court to afford heightened or even absolute deference to its
previous decisions interpreting statutes.4" If there is any consistency in
the Supreme Court's use of stare decisis,4" it is in its rhetorical distinction
between precedents interpreting federal statutes and those interpreting the
Constitution.42 In statutory construction cases, the Court has concluded
that "[c]onsiderations of stare decisis have special force in the area of
statutory interpretation, for here, unlike in the context of constitutional
interpretation, the legislative power is implicated, and Congress remains
free to alter what we have done."43
The degree of deference required even by the principle of statutory stare
decisis, however, is uncertain.' The Court has been willing to overturn
38. The term "supplemental jurisdiction" derives from the congressional codification ofthejudicial
doctrines of "pendent" and "ancillary" jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1988). See Thomas M. Mengler
et al., Congress Accepts Supreme Court's Invitation to Codify Supplemental Jurisdiction, 74
JUDICATURE 213 (1991). Supplemental jurisdiction affords the federal district courts original
jurisdiction over nonfederal, nondiverse claims which are "so related" to joined federal claims as to be
part of the same constitutional "case." Id.
39. Indeed, in Kardon, in which the court first created the private right of action for violations of
section 10(b), the court expressly did not reach the question whether that action arises under federal law
because there was federal court diversity jurisdiction in that case. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69
F. Supp. 512, 513 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
40. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 171 (1989) (refusing to overrule Runyon
v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976), despite its express acknowledgment that "[m]embers of this Court
believe that Runyon was decided incorrectly.")
41. But see Lawrence C. Marshall, "Let Congress Do It": The Case for an Absolute Rule of
Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 MICH. L. REv. 177, 179 (1989) ("The uncertainty about the current status
of stare decisis can be attributed, at least in part, to the fuzziness of the stare decisis principle itself.").
42. Id. at 181. ("The flip side of the Court's refusal to overrule constitutional precedents has been
its general reticence to overrule precedents construing statutes.').
43. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 172-73 (citing Square D. Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc.,
476 U.S. 409, 424 (1986); Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 (1977)).
44. Compare Patterson, 491 U.S. at 171-73 (refusing to overrule Runyon's interpretation of a
federal statute) with Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 480-81
(1989) (overruling Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953)) and Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v.
1994]
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its statutory precedents where "the intervening development of the law...
[has] weakened the conceptual underpinnings from the prior decision,"45
or where "later law has rendered the decision irreconcilable with competing
legal doctrines or policies ....,46
The Supreme Court's current approach to the issue whether the federal
courts have the power to create implied rights of action for the violation of
a federal statute is irreconcilable with the continued maintenance of the
section 10(b) private right of action. Some members of the Supreme Court
believe that private remedies should never be implied by the federal
judiciary under any circumstances.' Even in those rare cases in which
the Supreme Court has tolerated the judicial implication of private rights
of action,48 the Court has made it clear that the implication must be based
on evidence of congressional intent.49 Furthermore, the Court has rejected
as "entirely misplaced"50 the judicial implication of private remedies based
Mayacamas Corp., 108 S. Ct. 1133 (1988) (overruling Enelow v. New York Life Ins. Co., 293 U.S. 379
(1935)). See also Eskridge, supra note 22, at 1427-29. See generally Cooper, supra note 22;
Easterbrook, supra note 22.
45. See Patterson, 491 U.S. at 173 (citing Rodriguez de QuUas, 490 U.S. at 480-81; Andrews v.
Louisville & Nashville R.R., 406 U.S. 320, 322-23 (1972)).
46. See Patterson, 491 U.S. at 173 (citing Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Ct. ofKy., 410 U.S. 484,
497-99 (1973); Construction Laborers v. Curry, 371 U.S. 542, 552 (1963)). In such cases, the Court
"has not hesitated to overrule an earlier decision' Id.
47. See Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773, 2783 (1991)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 190 (1988); Cannon v. University
of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 730-49 (1979)).
48. With rare exception, the Supreme Court, in cases since and including the Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S.
66 (1975), decision, has denied the existence of a private remedy. See Thompson v. Thompson, 484
U.S. 174 (1988) (Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980); Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985) (Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974); Daily Income Fund,
Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523 (1984) (denying investment company an implied right of action under § 36(b)
of the Investment Company Act of 1940); Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers
Ass'n, 453 U.S. I (1981) (finding no implied right of action for contribution under Title VII or Equal
Pay Act); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of Am., 451 U.S. 77 (1981) (Rivers and
Harbors Appropriation Act); Universities Research Ass'n, Inc. v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754 (1981) (Davis-
Bacon Act); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979) (finding no private
remedy against accountants auditing financial reports as required by section 17(a) of the 1934 Act);
Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1 (1977) (holding that defeated tender offeror does not have an
implied cause of action against successful competitor under Williams Act). But see Merrell Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982) (finding implied remedy for damages
under the Commodity Exchange Act); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (finding
implied remedy under section 901 of Title IX).
49. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 688. See also Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568
(1979).
50. Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 568 ("Instead, our task is limited solely to determining whether
Congress intended to create the private right of action.").
[VOL. 72:287
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on the principles of federal court remedial power followed in earlier cases
such as Texas & Pacific Railroad Co. v. Rigsby,51 J.I. Case Co. v.
Borak,5" and Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.53  At the same time, the
Supreme Court has acknowledged that the judicial implication of the
section 10(b) private remedy is based on the reasoning of those outmoded
cases54 and cannot be supported by any evidence of congressional
intent.5  The Court has indicated that the continuing judicial recognition
of the section 10(b) private remedy is inconsistent with the current view of
implied rights of action. 6
Only an absolute rule of statutory stare decisis could protect the Supreme
Court's decisions recognizing a private right of action under section 10(b).
The argument for an absolute rule of statutory stare decisis, however, is
unavailing. Professor Marshall artfully has argued that if the Court were
to follow an absolute rule of stare decisis in its interpretations of statutes,
Congress properly would accept the burden of correcting judicial error."
He asserts that the Constitution in its delegation to Congress of legislative
powers, embodies a "normative vision of the judicial and legislative
functions that considers the federal judiciary's hesitance to overrule
statutory precedents an important element in the proper division of
responsibility between Congress and the courts.
58
This theory of absolute statutory stare decisis has been challenged on a
number of grounds, including the lack of any empirical support for its
assumption that the judiciary's refusal to correct its erroneous statutory
interpretations would stimulate Congress to do so.59 Professor Marshall
has responded to the critics of his proposed rule of statutory stare decisis
51. 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916).
52. 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964).
53. 69 F. Supp. 512, 512-13 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
54. See Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 113 S. Ct. 2085, 2088 (1993)
(citing Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730, 737 (1975)).
55. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773, 2780 ("[W]e have
made no pretense that it was Congress' design to provide the remedy afforded.. . .") (citing Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976)). See also Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 196 ("[T]here is no
indication that Congress, or the Commission when adopting Rule I ob-5, contemplated such a remedy.
56. Lampf, 111 S. Ct. at 2780.
57. Marshall, supra note 41, at 200-215.
58. Id. at 200.
59. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Case of the Amorous Defendant: Criticizing Absolute Stare
Decisions for Statutory Cases, 88 MICH. L. REv. 2450 (1990).
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by accusing them of having contempt for Congress.6"
But it is Professor Marshall's absolute rule of statutory stare decisis that
appears to flaunt congressional power. In defending his proposal, Professor
Marshall himself acknowledges that the theory of legislative acquiescence
is flawed because, inter alia, it permits courts to assign unjustifiable and
unconstitutional significance to the inaction of post-enactment Congress-
es.6" Nonetheless, Professor Marshall contends that courts should adhere
to their prior judicial interpretations of the intent of the enacting Congress
even when they believe that those interpretations are erroneous. 62 He
attempts to justify the perpetuation of erroneous interpretations of
congressional intent by claiming-admittedly without support-that such
perpetuation might induce Congress to legislate more often in the future.6a
When courts maintain a knowingly erroneous interpretation of the intent
of the enacting Congress, however, there can be no doubt that they
diminish the significance of that congressional intent. By blatantly refusing
to correct such erroneous interpretations, courts undermine the primacy of
legislative intent in judicial administration. This overt judicial refusal to
give priority to legislative will in interpreting pieces of legislation runs
contrary to any normative vision of the constitutional roles assigned to the
legislature and the judiciary.64 A rule of absolute statutory stare decisis
either tolerates this affront to legislative power or, at best, trades it for the
possibility that Congress might become more active in responding to the
judicial interpretations of its statutes. But the trade is inequitable: a blatant
assault on legislative power is tolerated in return for an unsubstantiated
hope that Congress might exert more legislative power in the future.
Yet, even an absolute rule of statutory stare decisis cannot preserve the
section 10(b) private right of action because the unconstitutionality of the
continuing federal court recognition of that action mandates that the
Supreme Court confront the propriety of its existence.65 In cases
construing the Constitution, "where correction through legislative action is
practically impossible," the Supreme Court "bows to the lessons of
60. Lawrence C. Marshall, Contempt of Congress: A Reply to the Critics of an Absolute Rule of
Statutory Stare Decisions, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2467 (1990).
61. Marshall, supra note 41, at 184-196.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. That refusal even runs contrary to Professor Marshall's normative vision of the balance of
legislative and judicial power. See id. at 200.
65. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64,77-78 (1938) (noting that "the unconstitutionality
of the course pursued" requires overruling venerable authority).
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experience and the force of better reasoning. 66 Accordingly, "adherence
to precedent is not rigidly required in constitutional cases."'67
The ongoing federal court acceptance of the section 10(b) private right
of action raises serious constitutional issues regarding the power of the
federal courts to make law, to expand their subject matter jurisdiction, to
enact legislation and to interpret congressional statutes in a manner
knowingly inconsistent with congressional intent.68 Whatever the proper
resolution of those constitutional issues, 69 their undeniable if subtle
presence in the Supreme Court's section 10(b) decisions permits the Court
to reject the precedent of those decisions in favor of the force of "better
reasoning."
Ill. THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE JUDICIAL CREATION AND
PERPETUATION OF THE SECTION 10(b) PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION
A. The Evolving Justifications for the Judicial Recognition of Private
Rights of Action
When Congress has not created an express private right of action for
damages caused by the violation of a statutory duty, the federal courts, in
limited circumstances, have implied such a right of action.7" The Supreme
Court's standard for determining whether to imply a private right of action
has undergone significant change.7" The changes in that standard typically
are characterized as an evolution in three stages.72 Initially, the Court
followed what has been called the relatively simple Rigsby73 approach.
This standard recognized broad federal court remedial power to create
private remedies for the violation of a federal statute so long as Congress
had not intended to remove that power. In a 1975 decision, Cort v. Ash,74
66. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 407-08 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
67. Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203,212 (1984) (citing Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. I11,
116 (1965); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665 (1944)). See also Earl M. Maltz, Some Thoughts
on the Death of Stare Decisis in Constitutional Law, 1980 WIS. L. REv. 467.
68. See discussion infra part III.
69. In part III, this Article demonstrates that the federal court recognition of the section 10(b)
implied remedy is unconstitutional.
70. See, e.g., Merrell Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 374 (1982).
71. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979).
72. Curran, 456 U.S. at 374.
73. Texas & Pac. R.R. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916). In Curran, the Supreme Court traced the
history of the judicial implication of a private remedy to Rigsby. Curran, 456 U.S. at 374.
74. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
1994]
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
the Court modified this implication standard, requiring a consideration of
four implication criteria: (1) whether the plaintiff is a member of the class
for whose "especial benefit" the federal statute was enacted; (2) the
legislative intent to create a private remedy; (3) the place of a private
remedy in the legislative scheme; and (4) whether the cause of action has
been "traditionally relegated to state law. '75 These four factors, however,
were quickly sharpened to one: the intent of Congress.76 Accordingly,
the Supreme Court's current approach to the judicial implication of a
private remedy is grudging. The federal courts have no power to create a
private remedy absent evidence that Congress intended such a remedy.
77
In deciding whether to create private remedies under the federal
securities laws, the federal courts have variously employed each of these
evolving standards. The decisions in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.,78
a federal court decision implying the section 10(b) private remedy, and JI.
Case Co. v. Borak,79 in which the Supreme Court created a private
remedy for violations of section 14(a) of the 1934 Act, were guided by the
Rigsby ° approach. Later in Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, however,
when the Supreme Court refused to recognize a private remedy for a
defeated tender-offeror under section 14(e) of the 1934 Act, it applied the
four-part Cort v. Ash implication test81. Finally, in Touche Ross & Co.
v. Redington,82 the Supreme Court, in rejecting a private right of action
for violations of section 17(a) of the 1934 Act,83 declared that its "task is
limited solely to determining whether Congress intended to create the
private right of action."84 Whether a private right of action exists for the
violation of any given federal securities law provision thus appears to be
a function of the time-period in which the Supreme Court decided the issue.
In the particular case of the section 10(b) private right of action,
however, the Supreme Court has never explicitly constructed a reasoned
75. Id. at 78. See also Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus. 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
76. Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 639 (1981). See also Touche Ross &
Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
77. See, e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 190 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring).
78. 69 F. Supp. 512, 513 (citing Rigsby, 241 U.S. at 39).
79. Borak, 377 U.S. at 433 (citing Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)).
80. Merell Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 375-77 (1982)
(characterizing the "Rigsby approach" which prevailed for "most of our history").
81. Piper, 430 U.S. at 39-41.
82. 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
83. 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1988). This section requires securities brokers and dealers to file and
maintain financial records.
84. Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 568.
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argument in favor of a section 10(b) private right of action. Rather, the
Court has offered casual-and varying-insight into its possible basis. The
Supreme Court first characterized its acceptance of the private remedy by
declaring that it had "explicitly acquiesced" in the lower federal court
recognition of the private remedy.85  In Musick, Peeler & Garrett v.
Employers Insurance of Wausau, the Court recently suggested that the
lower federal courts created the section 10(b) private remedy on the theory
that they are empowered to create remedies for violations of federal
statutes, even absent congressional intent. 6
As an alternative to this theory of federal court remedial power, the
Supreme Court has indicated that the section 10(b) private remedy also can
be justified by congressional acquiescence in the judicial creation of that
remedy. The Musick court found evidence of congressional acquiescence
in the federal courts' creation and interpretation of implied rights of action
under section 10(b). 87 In Basic Inc. v. Levinson,8" the Supreme Court
included "legislative acquiescence" as a foundation for the judicial
implication of the private section 10(b) remedy. Similarly, in Herman &
MacLean v. Huddleston,"9 the Court based its cumulative construction of
the remedies provided by the federal securities laws on congressional
acquiescence.
Hence, although the Supreme Court has never squarely held that a
private right of action exists under section 10(b), it has suggested two
theoretical bases for the private remedy: (1) federal judicial power to
create remedies, absent congressional intent, and (2) congressional
acquiescence in the federal judicial power to create remedies for statutory
85. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975). See also Cannon v.
University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 690-93 (1979); Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 577 n.19;
Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
86. Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 113 S. Ct. 2085, 2088 (1993) ("The
private right of action under Rule lOb-5 was implied by the judiciary on the theory courts should
recognize private remedies to supplement federal statutory duties, not on the theory Congress had given
an unequivocal direction to the courts to do so.") (citing Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 730, 737). In
the portion of Blue Chip Stamps cited in Musick, the court, in turn, cited Kardon and Borak for the
proposition that the "private enforcement of Commission rules may '[provide] a necessary supplement
to Commission action."' Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 730 (quoting J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S.
426, 432 (1964)).
87. Musick, 113 S. Ct. at 2088.
88. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230-31 (1988) ("Judicial interpretation and application,
legislative acquiescence, and the passage of time have removed any doubt that a private cause of action
exists for a violation of § 10(b) and Rule lob-5 .... ").
89. 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983).
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violations. Neither of these theories, however, can survive constitutional
analysis.
B. The Unconstitutional Judicial Creation of the Section 10(b) Private
Remedy Based Upon the Theory of Federal Court Remedial Power
1. The Theory of Federal Judicial Power to Create Remedies Absent
Congressional Intent
The Kardon9" court's primary rationale for creating the section 10(b)
private right of action was that the federal courts have the power to create
a private remedy in favor of persons for whom Congress has created a
statutory duty.91 The court reasoned that the violation of section 10(b) is
tantamount to a statutory tort; if the violation causes injury to an individual
for whose benefit the statute was enacted, then that individual may recover
damages as in tort.92 The court concluded that its implication of a private
remedy is "but an application of the maxim, Ubijus ibi remedium,"93 or
"where there is a right, there is a remedy."'94
The "right" which the Kardon court recognized does not derive from the
federal securities laws.95 Rather the "right" is the "right to recover
damages arising by reason of violation of a statute." 96  The Court
described this right as "fundamental," "deeply ingrained," and the product
of the "general law."'97 Accordingly, the question presented becomes not
whether Congress expressly or impliedly intended to create a private
remedy.9 To the contrary, the issue is "whether an intention can be
implied to deny a remedy and to wipe out a liability which, normally, by
virtue of basic principles of tort law accompanies the doing of the
prohibited act."99 Absent any evidence that Congress intended to remove
from the federal courts the power to apply the fundamental or general
principles of tort law, the Kardon court concluded that it possessed the
90. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
91. Kardon, 69 F. Supp. at 513 (citing Texas & Pac. KR. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916)).
92. Kardon, 69 F. Supp. at 513 (citing RESTATEMENT OF TORTS 206 (1939)).
93. Id. (citing Rigsby, 241 U.S. at 39).
94. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1520 (6th ed. 1990).
95. Hence, the Kardon court viewed the issue whether to create a section 10(b) private remedy




99. Id. (emphasis added).
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residual power to create a private section 10(b) remedy."°
Kardon's reasoning formed the basis of the wide-spread lower court
acceptance of the section 10(b) private remedy."' In Borak,'0 2 that
reasoning also was echoed by the Supreme Court in its decision to create
a private action for proxy fraud under section 14(a) of the 1934 Act. ' 3
The Court declared that it is "'well settled that where legal rights have been
invaded, and a federal statute provides for a general right to sue for such
invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy to make good the
wrong done."' In Musick, 5 the Supreme Court recently character-
ized the judicial recognition of the section 10(b) implied right of action as
the product of the line of reasoning set forth in the Borak case.
By that reasoning, the federal courts are empowered to create private
remedies unless Congress has indicated its intent to remove that power. 1
6
In Rigsby, the Supreme Court offered perhaps its fullest justification for this
exercise of federal judicial power:
A disregard of the command of the statute is a wrongful act, and where it
results in damage to one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute
was enacted, the right to recover the damages from the party in default is
implied, according to a doctrine of the common-law expressed.., in these
words: "So, in every case, where a statute enacts, or prohibits a thing for the
benefit of a person, he shall have a remedy upon the same statute for the
thing enacted for his advantage, or for the recompense of a wrong done to
100. Id. Significantly, the Kardon court had no cause to reach the issue whether its newly created
section 10(b) cause of action in favor of private investors arises under the federal securities laws. The
federal courts had subject matter jurisdiction over the matter based on diversity of citizenship.
101. See Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627, 632 n.15 (9th Cir. 1953); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg.
Co., 188 F.2d 783, 787 n.4 (2d Cir. 1951); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 71 F. Supp. 457,458 (D. Del.
1947), aftd. 235 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956); Osborne v. Mallory, 86 F. Supp. 869, 879 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
By 1969, the private right of action had been recognized by ten of the eleven courts of appeals. See
Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375 n.10 (1983) (citing 6 Louis Loss, SECURITIES
REGULATION 3871-73 (2d ed. Supp. 1969)).
102. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
103. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1988).
104. Borak, 377 U.S. at 433 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946)). The court also relied
upon section 27 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa, for its creation of the private action. That section
provides federal jurisdiction to the federal courts to "enforce any liability or duty" created by the 1934
Act.
105. Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 113 S. Ct. 2085, 2088 (1993).
106. Texas & Pac. R.R. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39-40 (1916). See also Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 374-75 (1982) ("Under this approach, federal courts
following a common-law tradition, regarded the denial of a remedy as the exception rather than the
rule.").
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him contrary to the said law." This is but an application of the maxim, Ubi
jus ibi remedium. 0 7
This justification of judicial power actually rests upon two independent
tenets: (a) the "right-remedy" principle of ubi jus ibi rermedium,10 8 and
(b) the "application" of that principle to the "right" to recover damages for
harm caused by the violation of a statute.109 Neither tenet, however,
justifies the exercise of federal judicial power to create a private remedy
absent congressional intent.
a. Ubi Jus Ibi Remedium
The source of the right-remedy principle frequently is traced to
Blackstone's Commentaries. 0  Indeed, that maxim "dominated
Blackstone's law of wrongs."' Blackstone began his chapter in his
Book of Private Wrongs on the Courts in General by declaring: "[I]t is a
general and indisputable rule, that where there is a legal right, there is also
a legal remedy, by suit or action at law, whenever that right is invad-
ed.""' 2 Similarly, Blackstone opened his treatment of the common-law
courts by reaffirming that "it is a settled and invariable principle in the
laws of England that every right when withheld must have a remedy, and
every injury its proper redress."' 3
A careful reading of Blackstone reveals, however, that he did not
understand the maxim, ubijus ibi remedium, to empower judges to create
remedies for all perceived wrongs." 4 In its proper historical context,
Blackstone's use of the right-remedy principle can be seen as an effort to
distinguish the civilized English legal system from so-called primitive legal
systems."5  Primitive systems operated on an ad hoc basis, finding
remedies for wrongs without a prior structure of rights. The civilized
English system, by contrast, proceeded in the reverse -order, fashioning
107. Rigsby, 241 U.S. at 39-40 (citations omitted). See also Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69
F. Supp. 512, 512-13 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
108. Rigsby, 241 U.S. at 3940.
109. Id.
110. See, e.g., id.; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
111. See Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REv. 209,
239 (1979).
112. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *23.
113. 3 Id. at *109. See also 3 id. at *86, *183-84, *266, *422.
114. See Kennedy, supra note 111.
115. In defining ubijus ibi remedium, Black's Law Dictionary states: "It is said that the rule of
primitive law was the reverse: Where there is a remedy, there is a right." BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY
1520 (6th ed. 1990).
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remedies after recognizing a system of rights."t6
Although at some points in the Commentaries, Blackstone described
judicial remedies as the natural result of any private wrong," 7 he did not
contend that the judicial system is or should be empowered to remedy all
wrongs. Instead, when Blackstone introduced the subject of the Courts of
Law In General, he was careful to cabin judicial power within the rubric
of rights recognized by law: "where there is a legal right, there is also a
legal remedy.'.. This significant qualification indicates that the courts
should not have the inherent power to remedy all wrongs; they should
apply only the legal remedies which the law has already created to redress
violations of legally recognized rights." 9 Blackstone thus extolled the
"excellence of our English laws" for their capacity "to adapt their redress
exactly to the circumstances of the injury.12  Even the judicial power
to adapt legal remedies to legal wrongs derives from legislation broadly
authorizing the evolution of remedies.'
116. Sir William Holdsworth locates the shift from the older view that ubi remedium ibijus (where
there is a remedy, there is a right) to ubijus ibi remedium (where there is a right, there is a remedy)
in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, primarily under the influence of Littleton. In Sir Edward
Coke's Commentary Upon Littleton, the author, in discussing tenancy in common, explained that, while
a single tenant in common may have an assisi for the moiety of a rent of (for example) twenty shillings,
the tenants in common shall join in an assisi for a rent of (for example) a horse. 2 SIR EDWARD COKE,
COMMENTARY UPON L1YrLETON 129 (1853). The novelty here is that the tenants in common were
allowed to join in an action as plaintiffs. Joinder was permitted in such a case because one man could
not recover the moiety of a horse "or any other entire thing," while a man could recover the moiety of
a severable or divisible rent such as twenty shillings. Id. If the tenants in common could not join,
Littleton observed, "'they should have damnum et injuriam, and yet should have no remedy by law,
which should be inconvenient, but the law will, that in every case where a man is wronged and
damaged, that he shall have remedy."' Id.
One of the earliest causes involving violation of a statute was Ashby v. White. 87 Eng. Rep. 808
(Q.B. 1702). This was a suit against the sheriff of Bucks for refusing to receive the plaintiff's vote in
a parliamentary election, in contravention of the plaintiff's right to vote. Id. at 808-810. To the
question whether the plaintiff should be able to maintain his suit, Chief Justice Holt answered: "[I]t
is vain thing to imagine that there should be right without a remedy; want of right and want of remedy
are termini convertibles." Id. at 815. The fact that the right is created by statute does not matter: "If
an Act of Parliament be made for the benefit of any person, and he is hindered by another of that
benefit, by necessary consequence of law he shall have an action; and the current of all the books is
so." Id.
117. See 3 BLAcKSTONE, supra note 112, at *266, *422.
118. 3 Id. at *23 (emphasis added). See also Blackstone's discussion of trespass on the case in
which he concluded: "For whenever the common-law gives a right or prohibits an injury, it also gives
a remedy..... 3 Id. at * 123.
119. 3 Id. at *266.
120. 3 Id.
121. Blackstone suggested that the Statute of Westminster II provides the prudent legislative process
for developing new remedies for new wrongs:
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Blackstone thus viewed the principle of ubi jus ibi remedium as a
necessary check on judicial power in a liberal society. The beauty of
English law is not so much that it provides legal remedies for the violation
of legal rights, but that it dictates a singular legal remedy for each
wrong."2 A legal system which assigns to each wrong a corresponding
remedy allows individuals to predict the legal consequences of their
conduct and to order their affairs accordingly." In order to preserve this
symmetrical and predictive function of the legal process, judicial power
must be curtailed. 24 In perhaps his most telling statement, Blackstone
concludes that the "excellence" of English law is that "as little as possible
is left in the breast of the judges, whom the law appoints to administer, and
not to prescribe the remedy."'" In a liberal regime, judges cannot create
rights and they cannot create remedies for any wrong they perceive. Judges
must administer the remedial system constructed by the legislature.'26
[W]hensoever from thenceforth in one case a writ shall be found in the chancery, and in a like
case falling under the same right and requiring like remedy no precedent of a writ can be
produced, the clerks in chancery shall agree in forming a new one: and, if they cannot agree,
it shall be adjourned to the next parliament, where a writ shall be framed by consent of the
learned in the law, lest it happen for the future that the court of our lord the king be deficient
in doing justice to the suitors.
3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 112, at *50-51 (quoting Statute of Westminster II, Y.B. 13 Edw. 1, c.24
(1285)). According to Blackstone, this statute was enacted "to quicken the diligence of the clerks in
the chancery," who were too attached to the old precedents, in devising new writs to give remedies in
cases in which remedies had never before been given. 3 Id. at *50. This accounts, he said, for the
great proliferation of writs of trespass on the case. "For wherever the common-law gives a right or
prohibits an injury, it also gives a remedy by action; and therefore, wherever a new injury is done, a
new method of remedy must be pursued." 3 Id. at *123. But see Theodore F.T. Plucknett, Case and
the Statute of Westminster I, 31 COLUM. L. REv. 778 (1931) (arguing that the writs of trespass on the
case expanded independently of the statute).
122. Blackstone wrote that the English laws "do not furnish one and the same action for different
wrongs, which are impossible to be brought within one and the same description.... ." 3 BLACKSTONE,
supra note 112, at *266.
123. Blackstone wrote: "[E]very man knows what satisfaction he is entitled to expect from the
courts of justice .... 3 Id.
124. 3Id.
125. 3Id.
126. In his comprehensive and insightful analysis of Blackstone, Professor Duncan Kennedy
observed:
[I]t seems reasonable to conclude that 'for every right a remedy' was more than merely a
claim that the administration of justice faithfully executed whatever a superior will
commanded. But it was less than a claim that the judges were empowered to devise a
remedial institution whenever they perceived behavior they themselves thought wrongful.
Kennedy, supra note I 11, at 243. According to Kennedy, Blackstone believed that common-law judges
were partially responsible for the wonderful symmetry between the laws of England and the laws of
nature. Yet, whatever Blackstone believed about the source of the rights of English citizens, he
undoubtedly believed that their preservation depended upon limiting the power of judges to fashion
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The Supreme Court's adoption of Blackstone's remedial principle in
Marbury v. Madison27 provides no additional justification for the federal
judicial power to create private remedies. Justice Marshall relied on
Blackstone when he declared:
The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every
individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury
.... The government of the United States has been emphatically termed a
government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this
high appellation if, the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested
legal right.'28
Yet, as employed by Justice Marshall, the right-remedy principle is even
more limited than that advanced by Blackstone.'29 Marshall chose to cite
those passages in Blackstone's Commentaries which make clear that the
judiciary has the limited power to administer the "legal remedy" which the
legislature has created for the invasion of a "legal right.""'3 Furthermore,
the Supreme Court in Marbury even recognized a significant "class of cases
which come under the description of damnum absque injuria; a loss
without an injury."''
The remedial issue in Marbury, therefore, was presented in descriptive
rather than normative terms. The Court had to decide whether the "laws
of [Marbury's] country afford[ed] him a remedy" for the violation of his
rights to a commission for his appointment as justice of the peace. 132
The question was not whether the laws of the United States should afford
a remedy; rather the issue was whether the laws of Marbury's country
afforded a remedy. Nor did Justice Marshall use the word "laws" in any
majestic, common-law sense. Instead, Marshall merely examined the
propriety of applying the existing statutory remedy of the writ of manda-
remedies contrary to the remedial system designed by the legislature.
127. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
128. Id. at 163.
129. The difference has been described as rhetorical. Richard H. Fallon & Daniel J. Meltzer, New
Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARv. L. REv. 1733, 1778 n.243 (1991)
("For reasons more of rhetorical structure than substance, however, Marshall's own formulation did not
take the classic ubijus, ibi remedium format").
130. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 163 (citing 3 BLAcKsTONE, supra note 112, at *23, *109).
131. Id. at 164.
132. Id. at 163. The first issue reached by the Supreme Court was whether Marbury had a right
to the commission pursuant to the Act of February 27, 1801, Ch. 15, § 11, 2 Stat. 107 (1807),
empowering the executive to appoint justices of the peace for five-year terms. The Court concluded
that once President Adams signed and sealed the commission, Marbury's right to the commission had
fully vested. Id. at 162.
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mus to persons acting under the authority of executive power.'33 The
writ is an extraordinary remedy, but it is one provided by statute. The writ
is available only when other legal remedies are inadequate for the
compulsion of a specific non-discretionary act required by law and readily
enforceable by the courts.134 The Court concluded simply that the writ
of mandamus was available in the factual situation presented.
The only troubling aspect of those facts is that they involved the
executive branch. A cabinet officer working under the authority of the
President must be judicially compelled to consummate the appointment. 35
Accordingly, the remedial issue was whether the executive branch is
immune from the operation of the statutorily created and otherwise
applicable remedy of mandamus for the violation of a legally recognized
right. It was in this context that Marshall cited Blackstone and proclaimed
that civil liberty and a government of laws depend upon the ability of
individuals to claim legal protection for the violation of their rights. t36
Marshall asserted that civil liberty and a government of laws cannot survive
if the executive branch is fully immune from the judicial enforcement of
statutorily created remedies. He did not argue that the essence of civil
liberty and of a government of laws consists of the judicial power to create
remedies for any perceived wrong, even if the wrong is the clear violation
of a legal right.
Indeed, Marshall concluded that while the executive branch is not fully
immune from the judicial enforcement of statutorily created remedies, that
branch does enjoy some immunity from judicial scrutiny in matters of
constitutional or legal discretion.1 37 If Blackstone's message is that civil
liberty requires judges to administer legislative remedies, then Marshall's
message is that civil liberty requires judges to administer faithfully
legislative remedies against the executive branch except in discretionary
matters. Neither message contains any basis for the judicial creation of
133. Id. at 172-73. The Judiciary Act of 1789 provided for a writ of mandamus "in cases warranted
by the principles and usages of law, to ... person holding office under the authority of the United
States."
134. Id. at 172-74. See also William Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969
DuKE L.J. 1, 13 (1969).
135. Professor Van AIstyne claims that "this was regarded at the time as the most critical issue,
with Jefferson taking the position that the Court had no authority thus to examine the exercise of
executive prerogatives." Van Alstyne, supra note 134, at 11.
136. Marbury, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) at 163.
137. Id. at 170. ("The province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals, not
to enquire how the executive, or executive officers, perform duties in which they have a discretion.").
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private remedies.
Nor can the Supreme Court's Rigsby'38 decision form the basis of the
federal court power to create private remedies. In that case, Rigsby sought
damages under the Federal Safety Appliance Acts'39 for injuries he
suffered while performing his duties as a railroad switchman.140 The
Federal Safety Appliance Acts required railroads operating in interstate
commerce to meet minimum federal safety standards, but they contained
no express right of action for injuries resulting from violations of those
standards.' 4 ' In recognizing a private remedy, the Supreme Court recited
the right-remedy principle. 4  However, the Court's argument favoring
the private remedy is based primarily upon congressional intent. The Court
asserted that Congress expressly declared its intent to "[p]romote the safety
of employees." The "inference of a private right of action," the court
claimed, "is rendered irresistible" by the statutory language removing from
any cause of action the defense of assumption of the risk.43 Further
evidence of congressional intent to create a private remedy was also found
in the clause reserving "liability in any remedial action for the death or
injury of any railroad employee."'"
Similarly, in Bell v. Hood,145 the Supreme Court trumpeted the
remedial principle, but ultimately refused to reach the issue whether a
private damage remedy exists for injuries resulting from the violation of
constitutional rights.'46 Because in that case it was the "pleaders'
purpose" to make violations of the Constitution the basis of their claims
and because the complaints were "drawn" in such a manner as "to seek
recovery" for constitutional violations, the Supreme Court found a
sufficient jurisdictional basis for the claims.147 The Court concluded that
the issue "whether federal courts can grant money recovery for damages
said to have been suffered" as a result of constitutional violations is itself
138. Texas & Pac. R.R. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916).
139. 36 Stat. 398 (1910); 27 Stat. 531 (1893) (amended 32 Stat. 943 (1903)).
140. Rigsby, 241 U.S. at 36.
141. See id. at 39.
142. Id. at 38.
143. Id. at 40.
144. Id. at 39. Because the action was removed to federal court by the federal railroad companies,
the Supreme Court did not have to reach the issue whether the cause of action asserted by Rigsby arose
under federal law or state common-law.
145. 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
146. Id. at 683-85.
147. Id. at 681-82.
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significant enough to "warrant exercise of federal jurisdiction.' 48
In suggesting that the action to recover damages was not "patently
without merit," the Court declared:
[W]here federally protected rights have been invaded, it has been the rule
from the beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their remedies so as to
grant the necessary relief. And it is also well settled that where legal rights
have been invaded, and a federal statute provides for a general right to sue
for such invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy to make good
the wrong done.149,
In its proper context, however, this declaration of federal judicial power is
not so profound. The declaration is presented only as a potential argument
which might be made on remand to support the merits of the allegations in
the complaint. The argument gives to those allegations a dubious sta-
tus-they are at least not "patently" without merit. 5 °
Even as a mere non-frivolous argument, the Supreme Court's assertion
about federal judicial power is heavily qualified. Courts do not create
remedies; they merely "adjust" them to grant "necessary" relief' The
Supreme Court invokes the familiar language that "federal courts may use
any available remedy to make good the wrong done," ' but only where
"legal" rights have been invaded and a federal statute provides for a "right
to sue for such invasion. ' 153 Accordingly, the maxim, "where there is a
right, there is a remedy" has not and cannot provide any independent
justification for the judicial creation of private remedies for statutory
violations absent legislative intent.
148. Id. at 684.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 683.
151. Id. at 684. The Court cites to Marbury for this proposition, but even with its contextual
limitations, the Marbury Court's formulation of this principle of federal judicial power was stronger:
where there is a legal right, there is a legal remedy.
152. Id.
153. Id. As Justice Harlan later indicated in his concurrence in Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of
the Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring), Bell is more about the
scope of federal remedial power than about the existence of federal remedial power. Assuming that the
federal courts have the power to enjoin constitutional violations, the only true issue presented in Bell
and in Bivens was whether that power extends to the remedy of damages. Since Bivens, the Supreme
Court has expressed its unwillingness to create private rights of action even for violations of
constitutional prohibitions. See Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988) (rejecting private remedy
for due process violations).
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b. The Right to Recover Damages for Statutory Violations
The judicial power to create private remedies for the violation of
statutory standards cannot be justified as an application of ubi jus ibi
remedium. Nor is the "right" to recover damages by reason of the violation
of a statute itself "fundamental" or "deeply ingrained" in the "basic
principles of tort law."154
In Rigsby, the Supreme Court's reliance on Couch v. Steel'55 to support
the proposition that judges may create a private right of action for the
violation of a statutory standard is misplaced. 56 Couch, a common
seaman, brought an action for damages against the owner of the vessel on
which he had served. 157  In the second count,'58 Couch alleged that he
was injured as a result of the shipowner's failure to keep on board a
sufficient supply of medicines, as required by statute.'59 The statute
prescribed a penalty for failure to keep the required medicines on board,
but the plaintiff in Couch did not sue for this penalty. Rather, he brought
an action on the case"6 to recover the damages he sustained as a result
of the defendant's breach of his statutory duty."6'
In ruling on the second count, Lord Campbell noted in dicta that if the
act sued upon had not provided a specific, express penalty for its breach,
"it seems clear that the action would be maintainable."' 62 The statute, he
observed, established a benefit for the seaman. The declaration alleged that
the defendant had violated this enactment, depriving the plaintiff of his
benefit and injuring his health.'63 Lord Campbell cited the general rule
that a man may have an action on the case for his damages when he has
154. See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 513, 513-14 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
155. 118 Eng. Rep. 1193 (1854).
156. Texas & Pac. R.R. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39-40 (1916). The Court also referred to the
statement by Chief Justice Holt in Anonymous, 87 Eng. Rep. 791 (Q.B., 1703) "[W]her-ever a statute
enacts anything, or prohibits anything, for the advantage of any person, that person shall have remedy
to recover the advantage given him ... 
157. Couch, 118 Eng. Rep. at 1193.
158. Id. at 1193-94. In the first count, Couch alleged that the defendant so "negligently managed,
fitted out and equipped" the vessel that it was unseaworthy and in a leaky and dangerous condition, as
a consequence of which the plaintiff became sick and suffered damages.
159. Id. at 1194.
160. Id. at 1196.
161. The defendant demurred to both counts. Id. at 1194. The demurrer was sustained with respect
to the first count. Id. at 1195-96.
162. Id. at 1196.
163. Id.
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been injured by the wrong of another."6  Yet, like Blackstone, Lord
Campbell found support for this general rule from the Statute of Westmin-
ster I1.16 According to Lord Campbell, Chapter 50 of that Statute 66
gave a remedy by action on the case to all who were aggrieved by the
neglect of any duty created by any statute. 6 7
Because the shipowner's statute sued upon in Couch did provide a
penalty for non-performance, however, the court addressed the question
whether that penalty should be the exclusive private remedy for a violation
of the statute. 68 The court attempted to draw a distinction between the
public wrong of failing to keep a sufficient supply of medicines on board
the ship and the private wrong of causing a special and particular damage
to an individual by failure to keep such medicines on board. 69 For the
public wrong, the court held that there was no remedy except that expressly
provided by statute. 7  The court found, however, that the penal statute
did not extend to circumstances involving personal injury resulting from the
breach of the public duty to carry medicines. Because the statute did not
contemplate compensation for private special damages, 17  it did not
eliminate the broader right created by the Statute of Westminster II to
maintain an action for special damages arising from the breach of any
statutory duty. The court concluded, therefore, that an action on the case
for special damages caused by the breach of a public duty could be
maintained.172
Had the terms of the statute been broad enough to provide a specific
remedy for injuries caused by violations of the statute's standards of
conduct, the court's decision would have been different. The court, by its
reasoning, would have concluded that the broad right to recover damages
created by the Statute of Westminster II was preempted by the precise
statutory remedies for injuries caused by the failure to maintain sufficient
medicine on the ship. The court's holding thus must be limited to
164. Id. (citing Comyn's Digest, Action upon the Case (A)).
165. 118 Eng. Rep. at 1196.
166. Statute of Westminster II, 13 Edw. 1, ch. 50 (Eng.).
167. 118 Eng. Rep. at 1196.
168. See id. at 1197 ("The penalty being annexed to the offence in the very clause of the Act
creating it, no indictment or other proceeding could be taken against the person making default for the
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situations in which the language of a narrow statute creating express
remedies for violations does not eclipse the broad statutory right to recover
damages for injuries caused by statutory violations.
Even this narrow holding, however, was cast into doubt in subsequent
actions on the case for violations of statutes prescribing penalties for their
breach. In Atkinson v. Newcastle & Gateshead Waterworks Co., 173 the
owner of a timber yard and sawmill which had been destroyed by fire
brought suit under the Waterworks Clauses Act (Act).174 The owner
alleged that because the defendants failed to provide water to the fireplugs
at the pressure required by the Act, such water was unavailable for use in
extinguishing the fire. 175 Section 43 of the Act set forth specific penalties
for a breach of the Waterwork's duties. 176 The court found that the Act
did not create any duty enforceable by the suit of individuals. 177 Rather,
the Act was intended to enumerate the duties of a public waterworks
company and to provide, by means of statutory penalties, guarantees for the
fulfillment of those duties.
178
The Atkinson court rejected the argument that Couch v. Steel supported
the plaintiff's right to sue for special damages. Though not expressly
overruling the case, none of the justices thought that the broad rule of
Couch could be sustained. 179  Furthermore, in subsequent cases, the
English courts blatantly rejected Couch and concluded that the presence of
a statutory penalty for public injuries would preclude the judicial creation
of additional private remedies for damages caused by the violation of a
statutory standard of care.'80 Although the holding of Couch has been
173. Atkinson v. Newcastle & Gateshead Waterworks Co., 2 Ex. D. 441 (C.A. 1877).
174. Waterworks Clauses Act, 10 Vict., ch. 17, §§ 42, 43 (1847).
175. 2 Ex. D. at 44243.
176. According to the court, the Act specified penalties for four classes of neglect: (1) failure to
fix, maintain, or repair fireplugs; (2) failure to furnish the town commission with a sufficient supply of
water for public purposes; (3) failure to keep the pipes charged under the required pressure (the specific
class of neglect sued upon); and (4) failure to furnish any owner or occupier with the supply of water
to which he was entitled. The Act provided a penalty of 10E for each such violation. Moreover, in the
second and fourth classes, the Act provided a further penalty for every day the neglect continued,
payable to the aggrieved party. Id. at 446.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 447.
179. Id. at 447-49.
180. In two later cases, the rule in Couch was rejected in favor of that announced in Atkinson:
Cowley v. Newmarket Local Bd., 1892 App. Cas. 345, 392 (H.L. 1892) (appeal taken from Q.B.), and
Saunders v. Holbom Dist. Bd. of Works [1895] 1 Q.B. 64, 68. Both cases were suits against a public
corporation which, through the neglect of its statutory duty, allegedly caused special damages to the
plaintiff. Cowley, 1892 App. Cas. at 346; Saunders, [1895] 1 Q.B. at 64. In both cases, the statute
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widely criticized, its dicta that a violation of a statute which does not
contain an exclusive penalty is actionable, has not suffered a similar
fate.1
81
American tort law, however, has since refined and narrowed that dicta
and effectively eliminated the unqualified right to recover damages for the
violation of a statute. The Restatement of Torts does make clear that tort
law permits judges to "adopt as the standard of conduct of a reasonable
man the requirements of a legislative enactment."' 82  Yet, it is no less
clear that tort law does not require any court to adopt a statutory prohibi-
tion as the standard of conduct of a reasonable man. 83 To the contrary,
the Reporters'Notes explaining section 286 of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts summarize the law as follows: "[T]he court is under no compulsion
to adopt the requirements of the enactment as the standard of conduct.
"184 Accordingly, tort law does not create a "right" in any meaningful
sued upon provided a penalty for non-feasance, but the plaintiff unsuccessfully attempted to invoke
Couch v. Steel to justify an action on the case for special damages. Cowley, 1892 App. Cas. at 348,
353; Saunders, 1 Q.B. at 68, 65. Furthermore, both cases cited Atkinson in refusing to follow the rule
in Couch. Cowley, 1892 App. Cas. at 352; Saunders, I Q.B. at 68.
181. For example, the case of Groves v. Wimborne (Lord), [1898] 2 Q.B. 402 (Eng. C.A.), involved
a violation of the Factory and Workshop Act which required dangerous parts of machinery in factories
to be fenced for the safety of the workers. While the Act did establish penalties for failure to keep the
machinery securely fenced, the court nonetheless held that a worker injured by improperly fenced
machinery could maintain an action on the statute for his special damages. In reaching this decision,
the court asked:
Could it be doubted that, if § 5 stood alone, and if no fine were provided by the Act for
contravention of its provisions, a person injured by a breach of the absolute and unqualified
duty imposed by that section would have a cause of action in respect of that breach? Clearly
it could not be doubted.
182. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965). Section 286, relied upon by the Kardon
Court, provides:
The violation of a legislative enactment by doing a prohibited act, or by failing to do a
required act, makes the actor liable for an invasion of an interest of another if:
(a) the intent of the enactment is exclusively or in part to protect an interest of the other as
an individual; and
(b) the interest invaded is one which the enactment is intended to protect; and,
(c) where the enactment is intended to protect an interest from a particular hazard, the
invasion of the interest results from that hazard; and,
(d) the violation is a legal cause of the invasion, and the other has not so conducted himself
as to disable himself from maintaining the action.
Id.
183. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 285-288 (1965). See also 28 EARL OF HALSBURY,
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 10-19 (Gavin T. Simonds ed., 3rd ed. 1952); JOHN F. CLERK & WILLIAM H.B.
LINDSELL ON TORTS 643-54 (15th ed. 1982); WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS
190-204 (4th ed. 1971).
184. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 reporters' notes (1965).
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sense to recover damages for the violation of a statute.
Tort law, however, does empower the court to adopt or borrow a
statutory standard in a civil action for damages. As the Kardon court
noted, when a court borrows a statutory standard for use in defining
negligence, it does more than follow a "canon of statutory interpreta-
tion."' 5  Yet, the court does much less than create a right to recover
damages for the violation of that standard. The statutory standard is
relevant to only one element in a tort action: the standard of care.186
The statute is not employed to create the right sued upon, to establish the
necessary causal connection between the breach of the standard of care and
the harm, or to provide the remedy. Thus, in the absence of any arguably
relevant statutory prohibition, the court is empowered to define the standard
of reasonable conduct by its own wits."'
Even when a relevant statutory prohibition exists, the court may ignore
that prohibition completely in defining the standard of reasonable
conduct. 88 Indeed, the unexcused violation of a legislative enactment
alone is not negligence per se. To the contrary, such a violation only
becomes negligence if the court has exercised its discretion and adopted
that standard as part of its definition of reasonable conduct.8 9  A
statutory prohibition by itself simply cannot create a right to recover
damages in tort.' 90
2. The Unconstitutionality of Federal Judicial Power to Create
Remedies Absent Congressional Intent
Apart from its historic roots, the judicial recognition of implied private
remedies has been justified by the judiciary's "well-defined" power to order
"familiar" remedies to enforce statutory obligations19 in "light of the
185. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
186. See, eg., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965).
187. Id. § 285.
188. Id. § 288 C ("Compliance with a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation does
not prevent a finding of negligence where a reasonable man would take additional precautions.").
189. See id. § 288 B.
190. If a statutory prohibition does not create a "right" to recover tort damages, then, even under
the ubijus ibi remedium maxim, there need not be any civil remedy for its violation. Statutes, however,
do create general rights to be free from violations of their prohibitions. When a statute is violated the
right to be free from such violation is violated as well. Under the right-remedy principle, the court
should be empowered to create a remedy for the violation of that right. As has been discussed,
howrever, the right-remedy principle does not empower courts to fashion remedies for all wrongs; rather
it directs the courts to administer the system of remedies created by the legislature.
191. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 376 (1982).
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statutory language and purpose."'" The Supreme Court thus has declared
that "there is no merit to the argument... that the judicial recognition of
an implied private remedy violates the separation-of-powers doctrine."'93
Furthermore, there is little doubt that "the federal judiciary has substantial
powers to construe legislation, including, when appropriate, the power to
prescribe substantive standards of conduct that supplement federal
legislation." '194
Although the common-law courts may retain the power to create private
remedies, the federal courts have no such power. When a federal court
creates a private right of action for the violation of a federal statute, that
court does more than prescribe standards of conduct or order familiar
remedies: it engages in an unconstitutional expansion of its limited power
to make law and an unconstitutional expansion of its limited subject matter
jurisdiction.19s
192. Id. (citing Jackson County v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 351 (1939)).
193. Curran, 456 U.S. at 375-76.
194. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 745 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
195. Justice Powell suggested in his dissent in Cannon that the issues of federal common-law and
federal jurisdiction are intertwined. Id. at 745 n.17 (Powell, J., dissenting). The federal courts have
no independent power to create federal common-law because the Constitution nowhere delegates that
power to the United States judiciary. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64,78 (1938) ("[N]o clause
in the Constitution purports to confer such a power upon the federal courts."). Absent a constitutional
delegation to the federal courts of the power to create common law, that power is reserved to the states.
U.S. CONST. amend. X.
The Constitution, however, does delegate to the United States Supreme Court judicial power over
cases "arising under" federal law. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. The Constitution also delegates to
Congress the power to create the lower federal courts. U.S. CONST. art III, § 1. Accordingly, Congress
has the constitutional power to create the federal district courts and to assign to them jurisdiction over
cases arising under federal law. Id. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. However, Congress cannot assign to the
federal courts any greater power than the Constitution assigns to the United States judiciary. Because
the Constitution does not delegate to the United States judiciary the power to create federal common
law, Congress cannot grant jurisdiction to the lower federal courts to resolve cases arising under federal
common-law. Instead, the jurisdiction of the federal courts is limited to cases arising under the
Constitution, treaties, or congressional enactments.
If, as Justice Powell recognized, the arising under jurisdiction of the federal courts is broad enough
to accept a state law cause of action which includes as an element the violation of a federal statute, then
the implication of a private remedy expands the scope of federal jurisdiction. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 745
n.17. Justice Powell concluded that to the extent that such an expansive interpretation of arising under
jurisdiction permits the federal courts to "assume control over disputes which Congress did not consign"
to them that interpretation is constitutionally defective. Id. Ironically, after Justice Powell's dissent in
Cannon, the Supreme Court rejected such an expansive interpretation of arising underjurisdiction. See
infra note 252 and accompanying text. Accordingly, this Article contends that even if a cause of action
can be implied for a section 10(b) violation, that action does not, and cannot consistent with the
Constitution, arise under federal law.
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a. The Federal Judiciary Has No Federal Common-law Power to
Create Private Remedies
Despite Erie's oft-cited proclamation that "[t]here is no federal general
common-law,"'196 federal courts have retained the power to create
common-law in two "restricted" circumstances:197  (1) when "necessary
to protect uniquely federal interests"'98 or (2) when Congress has "vested
jurisdiction in the federal courts and empowered them to create governing
rules of law." '199 The federal securities statutes, like most comprehensive
congressional regulatory schemes, embody a federal interest in eliminating
harmful conduct. However, they do not present the kind of "uniquely
federal interests" which empower the federal courts to fashion federal
common-law."° If that power exists in the realm of securities law, it
must derive from a specific congressional delegation to the federal courts
of both subject matter jurisdiction and the authority to create governing
rules of law.2 'O
Congress, however, has provided no such grant of power to the federal
courts. In the 1934 Act,202 Congress gave the federal district courts
"exclusive" subject matter jurisdiction over all "suits in equity and actions
196. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
197. See Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647 (1963). See also Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport
Workers, 451 U.S. 77 (1981); Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981); United
States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 308 (1947).
198. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 426 (1964). See, e.g., United States v.
Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580 (1973) (regarding the rights and obligations of the United
States); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943) (same); Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406
U.S. 91 (1972) (resolving interstate controversies); Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch
Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938) ("[C]ontroversies concerning... boundaries... have been recognized
as presenting federal questions."); Edwards v. Campagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256
(1979) (resolving admiralty disputes); Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Frita Kopke Inc., 417 U.S. 106 (1974)
(same).
199. Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 642 (1981). See also Wheeldin v.
Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 652 (1963); Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
200. See Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 113 S. Ct. 2085, 2088 (1993).
The Court in Texas Industries stated:
Admittedly, there is a federal interest in the sense that vindication of rights arising out of
these congressional enactments supplements federal enforcement and fulfills the objects of the
statutory scheme. Notwithstanding that nexus, contribution among antitrust wrongdoers does
not involve the duties of the Federal Government, the distribution of powers in our federal
system, or matters necessarily subject to federal control even in the absence of statutory
authority.
451 U.S. at 642.
201. Texas Industries, 451 U.S. at 642-43; Wheeldin, 373 U.S. at 652.
202. 15 U.S.C. § 78a-7811 (1988).
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at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by [the 1934 Act] or
the rules and regulations thereunder."2"a  This grant of jurisdiction,
however, is limited to actions based on liabilities or duties "created by" the
federal statute.2" As the Supreme Court has declared, this language
"creates no cause of action of its own force and effect; it imposes no
liabilities."2 5  Congress has expressly granted federal jurisdiction only
over actions created by the "substantive provisions" of the 1934 Act.
20 6
The mere grant of exclusive federal jurisdiction over actions expressly
created by a federal statute does not empower the federal courts to create
additional federal common-law actions which are not expressly created by
that statute.
207
Nor do the sweeping antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws
justify the creation of federal common-law rights. There is no doubt that
the federal securities laws represent a comprehensive congressional effort
to regulate interstate securities transactions.0 8 The existence of that
scheme alone, however, does not evidence a congressional intent to
delegate to the federal courts the power to fashion common-law rights.2 9
To the contrary, the "detailed and specific" remedial provisions throughout
the federal securities laws create a presumption that Congress did not
intend the federal courts to have the "power to alter or supplement the
remedies enacted."21  As the Supreme Court has recently concluded,
203. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1988).
204. Id.
205. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 577 (1979) (holding that the grant of subject
matter jurisdiction in section 27(a) of the 1934 Act does not alone empower the federal courts to create
private remedies for violations of the reporting requirements of section 17(a) of the 1934 Act).
206. Id. at 577.
207. See, e.g., Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986); Texas Indus. v.
Radcliffe Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 643-46 (1981) (reasoning that the congressional delegation to
the federal courts of exclusive jurisdiction over unique remedies for antitrust law violations does not
include a delegation to create an additional common-law right to contribution).
208. The federal regulatory scheme is based upon the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-
77aa (1988), the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811 (1988), and their amendments.
See, e.g., The Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d), (e), 78n(d), (f) (1988). The 1933 Act regulates the
offer or sale of securities by means of a materially false registration statement, 15 U.S.C. § 77k, or
prospectus, 15 U.S.C. § 771(2). The scope of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is far more broad.
It governs registration, distribution, sale, and resale of securities in interstate commerce. See, e.g., 15
U.S.C. § 7Sj(b) (making unlawful use of interstate commerce to "use or employ any manipulative or
deceptive device."). The 1934 Act renders unlawful fraud in the sale and purchase of securities, 15
U.S.C. § 78j(b), as well as manipulation, insider trading, and misstatements in filed documents, 15
U.S.C. §§ 78i, 78b, 7Sr(a).
209. See Texas Industries, 451 U.S. at 644-45.
210. Id. at 645.
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"'[t]he presumption that a remedy was deliberately omitted from a statute
is strongest when Congress has enacted a comprehensive legislative scheme
including an integrated system of procedures for enforcement.' 21  Even
in the context of the antitrust laws under which the "federal courts enjoy
more flexibility and act more as common-law courts than in other areas
governed by federal statute,"2 2 the Supreme Court has held that congres-
sional delegation of federal jurisdiction over a comprehensive remedial
scheme does not include a delegation of the power to create federal
common-law remedies.1 3
Moreover, the necessity for federal courts to interpret and apply
congressional statutes does not empower those courts to supplement the
remedies provided in such statutes. The federal courts certainly have the
authority to give "concrete meaning" to federal statutes through a "process
of case-by-case judicial decision in the common-law tradition." 214
Jurisdiction to resolve cases or controversies created by federal statutes
naturally includes the power to interpret "ambiguous or incomplete
provisions. '2" The power to develop a federal common-law through
court decisions interpreting and applying federal statutes, however, does not
extend to the creation of remedies not within the statutes.1 6 The federal
courts' inherent authority to interpret federal securities laws in the course
of deciding the myriad actions expressly created by those laws, therefore,
does not include the authority to create additional private common-law
remedies.
b. The Federal Judiciary Has No Power to Expand Its Subject Matter
Jurisdiction to Include the Section 10(b) Private Remedy
Even if the federal courts had the power to create a private, common-law
cause of action for the violation of section 10(b), the federal district courts
211. Id. (quoting Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451 U.S. 77, 97 (1981)).
212. Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 98 n.42 (citing National Society of Professional Engineers v.
United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978)).
213. Texas Industries, 451 U.S. at 646. Even in the exercise of its admiralty jurisdiction, the
Supreme Court has refused to "fashion new remedies if there is a possibility that they may interfere
with a legislative program." Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 97 n.40 (citing Halcyon Lines v. Haenn
Ship Corp., 342 U.S. 282, 285-87 (1952)).
214. Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 95.
215. Id. at 97.
216. Texas Industries, 451 U.S. at 646 ("In almost any statutory scheme, there may be a need for
judicial interpretation of ambiguous or incomplete provisions. But the authority to construe a statute
is fundamentally different from the authority to fashion a new rule or to provide a new remedy which
Congress has decided not to adopt") (citing Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 97).
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nonetheless would lack subject matter jurisdiction over that action. The
1934 Act's specific grant of exclusive jurisdiction over actions to enforce
liabilities "created by" that Act does not alone provide for subject matter
jurisdiction over judicially-created actions such as the private section 10(b)
remedy."7  Furthermore, although Congress has granted the federal
district courts original jurisdiction over "all civil actions arising under the
... laws ... of the United States," ' that grant of jurisdiction does not
extend to judicially-created private actions for the violation of a federal
statute.
The Constitution provides that the federal judicial power shall extend to
"all Cases in Law and Equity, arising under ... the laws of the United
States."2"' This constitutional grant of jurisdiction has been interpreted
with "great breadth" to confer original jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court
"whenever a federal question is an 'ingredient' of the action" or whenever
a case involves "'potential federal questions.""'22
This broad grant of jurisdiction, however, has no independent application
to the lower federal courts. Instead, the Constitution empowers Congress,
and only Congress, to create "tribunals inferior to" the Supreme Court and
to define the jurisdiction of those inferior federal courts.22 ' The lower
federal courts have no constitutional power to expand their own subject
matter jurisdiction. 2  While Congress cannot assign the lower federal
courts any more power than the Constitution confers upon the Supreme
Court, Congress can assign to those courts less power than allowed by the
Constitution.' Indeed, although Congress' statutory grant of jurisdiction
to the lower federal courts virtually copies the Constitution's grant of
federal judicial power,224 the Supreme Court has interpreted the congres-
sional delegation much more restrictively than its constitutional counter-
part.
2 25
217. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1988). See also Touche Ross, 422 U.S. at 577.
218. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988).
219. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
220. See Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 818 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
221. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. See also U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 7; Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 807
(recognizing that constitutional grant of judicial power is not "self-executing").
222. American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17 (1951); Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S.
182 (1943); Kline v. Burke Const. Co., 260 U.S. 226 (1922). See also United States v. New York Tel.
Co., 434 U.S. 159, 179 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
223. See U.S. CONST. amend X.
224. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988) ("The distict courts shall have original jurisdictions of all civil
actions arising under the.., laws.., of the United States.").
225. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 807.
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Under the Supreme Court's current view of the congressional grant of
"arising under" jurisdiction to the lower federal courts, there is no doubt
that those courts have the power to hear cases in which a federal statute
actually "creates" the cause of action.226  In Moore v. Chesapeake &
Ohio Railroad,227 the Supreme Court concluded, however, that an implied
right of action for the violation of a federal statute is created by state law.
Moore filed two claims against the railroad alleging that he was injured as
a result of a defective lever which he used in attempting to uncouple freight
cars. The Court concluded that the first claim, brought pursuant to the
Federal Employers' Liability Act which provides for an express private
right of action, clearly arose under federal law.228 However, the Supreme
Court held that the second claim did not arise under federal law because
the allegations in Moore's complaint relied upon the Federal Safety
Appliance Acts for the duty of care and not for the right to sue.229
Although the federal statute supplied the duty, the "right to recover
damages ... sprang from the principle of the common-law" and therefore
supplied no basis for federal court "arising under" jurisdiction." The
Moore Court reconciled its holding with Rigsby by explaining that Rigsby
was "brought in the state court and was removed to the federal court upon
the ground that the defendant was a federal corporation."'"
In its Moore decision, the Supreme Court made clear that any private
right of action for the violation of a federal statute which is created by the
court absent congressional intent must have its origin in state tort law.
232
Therefore, an implied section 10(b) right of action must be a creation of
state law2 3 to the extent that its basis is a theory of judicial power that
permits the creation of private remedies absent an expressed contrary
226. Id. at 808 (citing American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260
(1916)).
227. 291 U.S. 205 (1934).
228. Id. at 211.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 215 n.6.
232. Id. at 215 ("The Safety Appliance Acts having prescribed the duty in this fashion, the right
to recover damages sustained by the injured employee through the breach of duty sprang from the
principle of the common-law ... ').
233. Indeed, there is no genuine dispute that Congress, in enacting the 1934 Act, did not create
private remedies for the violation of section I 0(b). See, e.g., Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow
v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773, 2780 (1991) ("MW]e have made no pretense that it was Congress' design
to provide the remedy afforded.').
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congressional intent. 4 Because section 10(b) does not expressly create
a private cause of action, subject matter jurisdiction for such an action must
be based on the "presence of a claimed violation of the statute as an
element of a state cause of action." ' There is considerable doubt,
however, whether the federal courts are empowered to hear claims that are
not created by federal law, but which merely hinge on a question of federal
law.2
6
In Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust,2
37
the Supreme Court declared that a case may arise under federal law "where
the vindication of a right under state law necessarily turned on some
construction of federal law." 8  As the Supreme Court itself cautioned
in Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals v. Thompson, however, its "actual
holding" in Franchise Tax rejects this basis for federal jurisdiction.2"
The Supreme Court acknowledged that the plaintiffs' state law claims in
Franchise Tax hinged on a substantial question of federal law; yet, the
Supreme Court nonetheless denied the existence of "arising under"
jurisdiction.240 In Merrell Dow, the Supreme Court explicitly indicated
that the federal district courts have no jurisdiction over causes of action
created by state law, even those which necessarily depend upon the judicial
construction of a federal statute.24 The plaintiffs in Merrell Dow sought
damages for injuries allegedly caused by the company's failure to satisfy
the branding requirements 242 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics
Act (FDCA).243  The Supreme Court assumed that the FDCA did not
itself create a private right of action for monetary relief.2" The Court
234. See, e.g., Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946); Musick,
Peeler & Garrett v. Employer's Ins. of Wausau, 113 S. Ct. 2085, 2088 (1993).
235. See Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 814 (1986).
236. See id. at 813-14. See also id. at 821 n.l (Brennan, J., dissenting). Compare Moore v.
Chesapeake & Ohio R.R, 291 U.S. 205 (1934) with Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S.
180 (1921).
237. 463 U.S. 1 (1983).
238. Id. at 9.
239. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 809.
240. See id. at 801.
241. Id. at 817.
242. Id. at 805.
243. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-333 (1988).
244. 478 U.S. at 810. Both parties agreed that the FDCA contains no private right of action.
However, that concurrence is hardly based on the merits of the arguments rejecting the private remedy.
Rather, despite their desire to litigate in federal court, the defendants did not wish to acknowledge the
existence of any private FDCA remedy which could be used against them. The plaintiffs, despite their
desire for a remedy, denied the existence of a federal cause of action so that they could remain in state
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol72/iss1/5
PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION
further assumed that "some combination" of the then-controlling Cort v.
Ash241 implication factors were not present.246  Accordingly, the Court
reasoned that "careful scrutiny of legislative intent" would reveal the
absence of any congressional desire to provide for a private right of
action.247 The Court concluded:
the congressional determination that there should be no federal remedy for the
violation of this federal statute is tantamount to a congressional conclusion
that the presence of a claimed violation of the statute as an element of a state
cause of action is insufficiently 'substantial' to confer federal-question
jurisdiction.248
The Court found that the federal statutory issue was not sufficiently
substantial despite Congress' comprehensive scheme for enforcing federal
food, drug and cosmetic standards and despite Congress' grant of exclusive
federal jurisdiction2 49 for all claims brought under the statute. 20  What-
ever doubt remains after Merrell Dow regarding the extent of federal
jurisdiction over state law claims which depend on a "substantial question"
of federal law,"' it is clear that district courts have no jurisdiction over
a state law claim that depends on the construction of a federal statute.252
court.
245. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
246. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 810-11.
247. Id. at 811 (citing Merrell Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 377
(1982)).
248. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 814.
249. Id. at 830 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing 21 U.S.C. §§ 332(a), 333, 334(a)(1) (1988)).
250. "Congress structured the FDCA so that all express remedies are provided by the federal courts
. .Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 831 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The FDCA in this respect is
indistinguishable from the 1934 Act. Both create exclusive jurisdiction in federal courts for express
remedies, and both create a specialized administrative agency responsible for overseeing implementation
and enforcement of the statutory standards. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 27a (1988).
251. The Merrell Dow majority did not eliminate federal jurisdiction for state law claims which turn
on a substantial question of federal law. 478 U.S. at 814. The Court concluded that the presence of
a federal statutory standard as an element of a state-law cause of action did not rise to the level of a
substantial federal question. Id.
252. The Merrell Dow majority reconciled its holding with Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co.,
255 U.S. 180 (1921), by suggesting that Smith involved a question of the "constitutionality of an
important federal statute" rather than merely the construction of an important federal statute. 478 U.S.
at 814 n.12. The "nature" of the constitutional issue at stake in Smith was different from the "nature"
of the federal statutory issue at stake in Merrell Dow. See David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and
Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 568 (1985); William Cohen, The Broken Compass: The
Requirement that a Case Arise "Directly" Under Federal Law, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 890, 916 (1967);
MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONs IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 67
(1980). The dissent took issue with the majority's effort to reconcile Smith, asserting that Smith is a
vital and influential case which cannot be reconciled on a clearly-defined and principled basis with
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Under the reasoning of Merrell Dow, Franchise Tax and Moore,
therefore, the presence of a claimed section 10(b) violation as an element
of a state law action for damages is "insufficiently 'substantial' to confer
federal-question jurisdiction." 3  The original congressional determination
rejecting a private remedy for the violation of section 10(b) is "tantamount"
to a congressional conclusion that the necessity of construing that standard
in resolving a state law claim does not present a "substantial" federal
question.
Even if the federal courts had the power to imply a private cause of
action for a section 10(b) violation they would have no independent
"arising under" jurisdiction over that private cause of action.254 The
continued recognition of federal subject matter jurisdiction over the section
10(b) private action is an unconstitutional exercise of the federal judicial
power.
Merrell Dow. 478 U.S. at 821 n.l (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Yet, there can be no dispute that the Supreme Court has made a clear distinction between
constitutional questions at stake in cases such as Smith and the federal statutory questions at stake in
cases such as Merrell Dow. In Smith, the Supreme Court affirmed federal jurisdiction over a
shareholder's suit to enjoin a corporation from issuing bonds on the grounds that the federal statute
which authorized the issuance was unconstitutional. Smith, 255 U.S. at 199. The Court announced the
"general rule" that federal jurisdiction exists when the plaintiff's "right to relief depends upon the
construction or application of the Constitution or laws of the United States, and that such federal claim
is not merely colorable, and rests upon a reasonable foundation .. " Id. Yet, in Smith, the Court
argued that it was the "constitutional validity of an act of Congress which is directly drawn in question"
which supported the exercise of federal jurisdiction. Id. at 201.
In Moore, by contrast, the federal question derived from a federal statute (the Federal Safety and
Appliance Acts) which created a duty, the breach of which gave rise to a state-law tort action. 291 U.S.
at 216-17 ("The federal statute, in the present case, touched the duty of the master at a single point and,
save as provided in the statute, the right of the plaintiff to recover was left to be determined by the law
of the State.") (quoting Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry. v. Popplar, 237 U.S. 369, 372 (1915)).
Similarly, in Merrell Dow, the FDCA touched the duty of drug manufactures such as Merrell Dow at
a single point, and the right of the plaintiff to recover was left to be determined by state law.
The jurisdictional distinction between claims that depend upon a construction of a federal statute and
those that depend upon a construction of the Constitution has also been struck in the Supreme Court's
implied right of action decisions. See Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988).
253. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 814.
254. Federal courts of course would have subject matter jurisdiction over the section 10(b) private
cause of action in diversity cases, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988), or in cases in which that action is
supplemental to other claims for which there is an independent jurisdictional basis. 28 U.S.C. § 1367
(1988). See, e.g., Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513 (E.D. Pa. 1946); Moore v.
Chesapeake & Ohio R.Rt, 291 U.S. 205, 214-15 (1934).
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C. The Unconstitutional Judicial Perpetuation of the Section 10(b)
Private Remedy Based on the Theory of Congressional Acquiescence
The Supreme Court alternatively has suggested that the theory of
"legislative acquiescence justifies" the continuing judicial recognition of the
section 10(b) private right of action.25' In its purest form, the theory of
legislative acquiescence is that congressional silence in the wake of the
judicial construction of a statute indicates congressional approval of that
constrction. 6  The theory gains additional strength when Congress has
either reenacted 7 a statute without altering the judicially construed
portion or has altered other provisions of the statute, but has left intact the
judicially construed portion.258 The Supreme Court has expressed sharply
divergent views on the inferences that can be drawn from both absolute
congressional silence 9 and congressional silence in the midst of a
261revisitation. Scholars also disagree about the legitimate inferences that
can be drawn from congressional inaction.26'
The premise that congressional inaction is tantamount to, or evidence
of, congressional approval of the judicial interpretation of a statute,
255. Herman & Maclean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 384 (1983). See also Basic, Inc. v.
Levinson, 485 U.S. 224,230-31 (1988); Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employer's Trust Ins. of Wausau,
113 S. Ct. 2085, 2088 (1993) (characterizing the implication of the section 10(b) private remedy as the
product of federal court power to supplement statutory duties, but insisting on evidence of legislative
intent or acquiescence in its creation of an implied right to contribution under that section).
256. The Supreme Court has explained this principle in these terms: "When a court says to a
legislature: 'You (or your predecessor) meant X,' it almost invites the legislature to answer: 'We did
not."' Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 630 n.7 (1987) (quoting GUIDO CALABRESI,
A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTEs 31-32 (1982)).
257. See Huddleston, 459 U.S. at 384; Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580-81 (1978).
258. See, e.g.,Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 580-81; Don E. Williams Co. v. Commissioner, 429 U.S. 569,
576-77 (1977); United States v. Hermanos y Co., 209 U.S. 337, 339 (1908). But see Leary v. United
States, 395 U.S. 6, 24-25 (1969); United States v. Calamaro, 354 U.S. 351, 359 (1957); Commissioner
v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955).
259. Compare Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69 (1946) ("It is at best treacherous to find
in [c]ongressional silence alone the adoption of a controlling rule of law.") with Apex Hosiery Co. v.
Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 488 (1940) ("The long time failure of Congress to alter the Act after it had been
judicially construed ... is persuasive of legislative recognition that the judicial construction is the
correct one.').
260. Compare Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 580-81 with Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6,24-25 (1969).
261. See, e.g., Marshall, supra note 41; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction,
87 MICH. L. REv. 67 (1988); John C. Grabow, Congressional Silence and the Search into Legislative
Intent: A Venture Into "Speculative Unrealities," 1984 B.U. L. REv. 737; Laurence H. Tribe, Toward
a Syntax of the Unsaid: Construing the Sounds of Congressional and Constitutional Silence, 57 IND.
L.J. 515 (1982).
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however, is deeply flawed. The theory of legislative acquiescence is
contrary to the realities of congressional conduct and to the constitutional
roles assigned to the legislature and judiciary.262 Legislative acquies-
cence, therefore, is not a legitimate basis for the perpetuation of the
judicially-created section 10(b) private remedy.
1. The Theory of Congressional Acquiescence Has No Evidentiary
Foundation
First, there is no evidence that a majority of the members of Congress
typically is aware of court decisions interpreting statutes.263 What evidence
there is suggests that "most Supreme Court decisions never come to the
attention of Congress."2' Even if some members of Congress by virtue of
their leadership or subcommittee roles follow judicial interpretations of
legislation, their knowledge rarely spreads to a majority of the Senate and
the House of Representatives.265
Second, even if Congress is fully aware of the judicial construction of its
legislation and even if a majority of Congress disagrees with that
construction, there is no guarantee that Congress will take corrective action.
Congressional inaction is often the product not of approval, but of
"2666
"inertia " 6 or even "paralysis. 267
262. Professor Marshall has thoroughly attacked this premise in the context of statutory stare
decisis. He shows that ignorance, inertia, interpretational ambiguity and irrelevance make it difficult
to infer congressional approval from congressional inaction. Marshall, supra note 41, at 186-200.
263. See, e.g., SAMUEL KRISLOV, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS 144 (1965)
("No study has been undertaken to estimate the number of Court decisions heavily criticized in
Congress ....').
264. See Marshall, supra note 41, at 186 (quoting Abner J. Mikva, How Well Does Congress
Support and Defend the Constitution?, 61 N.C. L. REV. 587-609 (1983)). See also WILLIAM J. KEEFE
& MoRIS S. OGUL, THE AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE PROCESS: CONGRESS AND THE STATES 420 (1981)
("[L]egislative bodies rarely concern themselves with activities of courts . . . .'); Abner J. Mikva, A
Reply to Judge Starr's Observations, 1987 DUKE L.. 380, 384 ("Most of the time Congress does not
read judicial decisions. ').
265. See Marshall, supra note 41, at 189 (citing DAVID J. VOGLER & SIDNEY R. NVALDMAN,
CONGRESS AND DEMOCRACY 112 (1985)) ("In the absence of an actual vote by an entire body, it seems
unrealistic to assume that members of Congress are made more knowledgeable about a decision simply
because some committee holds a hearing or some members make speeches about it.").
266. See id. at 190-91. Professor Marshall quotes Hart and Sacks' classic work on legislation for
a sampling of the factors which would cause Congress to "decline to overrule a decision with which
most members disagree": "[b]elief that the bill is sound in principle but politically inexpedient to be
connected with"; "[u]nwillingness to have the bill's sponsors get credits for its enactment"; "[b]elief that
the bill is sound in principle but defective in material particulars"; "[tientative approval, but belief that
action should be withheld until the problem can be attacked on a broader front"; and "Etc., etc., etc.,
etc., etc." HENRY M. HART & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
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Third, even if congressional inaction does indicate approval of the
judicial construction of a statute, it is often difficult to determine which
precise aspect of that construction is being applauded by Congress.
Congressional silence may indicate approval of the court's actual result in
a case, or it could indicate an endorsement of the court's exercise of power
in interpreting the statute."* In addition, Congress could approve of the
court's disposition of the case on a substantive or procedural point wholly
unrelated to the legislation. Indeed, the ambiguity present in virtually every
court decision naturally renders congressional inaction in the wake of a
court decision also ambiguous.
2. The Theory of Congressional Acquiescence Has No Constitutional
Foundation
The inference of congressional approval from congressional silence is not
only contrary to fact, but also contrary to the constitutional roles assigned
to the legislative and judicial branches. The Constitution, with rare clarity,
requires that before a law can be enacted, it must be "passed" by both
houses of Congress and "presented" to the President.269 This requirement
insures a multi-faceted balance of power: (1) a law cannot be enacted
without approval of both the House and the Senate, giving to each veto
power; (2) a law cannot be enacted without presentation to the President,
giving to the President modified veto power;270 and (3) the judiciary
cannot enact a law.
Equating congressional inaction with congressional approval of the
judicial interpretation of a statute threatens each of these balances. The
equation effectively gives to each house of Congress not the power to veto
legislation, but the power to pass legislation. For, so long as one house
fails to pass legislation disapproving the judicial interpretation of a statute,
Congress as a whole is deemed to approve that legislation. Although a
minority of the most powerful members within each house does not have
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1395-96 (1958).
267. Marshall, supra note 41, at 191-92.
268. Id. See also Grabow, supra note 261, at 749.
269. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7 ("Every bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and
the Senate, shall, before it becomes a Law, be presented to the President of the United States."). See
also Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986); Chadha v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 462 U.S.
919 (1983) (observing that presentment clause and bicameral enactment are "integral parts of the
Constitutional design for the separation of powers").
270. Congress retains the power to override a presidential veto by a two-thirds vote. U.S. CONST.
art. 1, § 7.
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the power to pass legislation,27' that minority may well have the power
to block legislation.272 Under the theory of legislative acquiescence, if
a strong minority of one house blocks legislation that would negate the
judicial interpretation of a statute, that minority is treated as having the
affirmative power to fashion legislation approving the interpretation.273
Similarly, the doctrine of legislative acquiescence usurps the presidential
veto power. The constitutional requirement that legislation be presented to
the president for a potential veto creates an additional countermajoritarian
check on that legislation.274 The President's veto not only gives the
executive branch the power to block legislation, it also helps to focus
public attention on that legislation.275 When the presidential veto is
exercised, the constitutional requirement of a two-thirds vote to override the
veto empowers a minority of Congress to prevent the enactment of the
legislation. Additionally, the override requirement extends the length and
intensity of public analysis of the legislation.
The theory of legislative acquiescence upsets this process at every turn.
By failing to pass legislation disapproving the judicial construction of a
statute, Congress is construed to enact legislation approving that construc-
tion. By its inaction, Congress thereby avoids the need to present its laws
to the President; presidential veto power; constitutional check on its
lawmaking power; and public scrutiny which comes from the process
itself.276 The judicial treatment of congressional inaction as the equivalent
of congressional legislation, therefore, disrupts the constitutional roles
assigned to the President and the Congress in the lawmaking process.
The doctrine of legislative acquiescence also upsets the roles which the
271. RULES OF THE HousE OF REPRESENTATIVES, H.R. Doc. No. 279, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 508
(1987).
272. See Marshall, supra note 41, at 188 ("[T]he power of congressional leaders is largely a
negative power, they often can control the agenda in a manner that effectively kills certain proposed
legislation.").
273. As Professor Marshall writes, "A court that relies on acquiescence does far more than give a
veto power to a minority of the legislature. The court, in essence, treats Congress' silence as the
functional equivalent of an affirmative congressional enactment endorsing the court's earlier (now
recognized as erroneous) decision." Id.
274. See id. ("A great many provisions of the Constitution (including bicameralism, the executive
veto, and judicial review) present impediments to the passage of legislation, reflecting the essentially
conservative bias of our system of government.') (citing JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REvIEW AND THE
NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 26 (1980)).
275. Id. at 194.
276. See id. ("Inaction enables Congress to effectuate its will without ever risking presidential veto
(not to mention public scrutiny or pressure).").
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Constitution assigns to the legislative and judicial branches of government.
The Constitution requires that "[a]ll legislative powers" shall be vested in
Congress.277 This apparently clear assignment of legislative power has
been interpreted in two different ways. The delegation of power might
mean that Congress has the exclusive power to make law and therefore the
judiciary is constitutionally prohibited from doing so.278 On the other
hand, the Constitution's delegation of "legislative powers" to the Congress
has been interpreted as an exclusive delegation only of the power to enact
statutes, leaving to the federal courts the power to create common-law.2 79
But even the most strident advocates of federal judicial power accept the
qualification that a court applying a statute should attempt to interpret the
legislature's will and not create its own law.28
When the courts presume congressional approval from congressional
silence, they not only fail to administer the legislature's will, but also
expressly and knowingly interpret the statute in a manner contrary to the
will of that legislature. The theory of legislative acquiescence presumes
congressional intent from the silence of the legislature in the wake of a
court decision interpreting a statute. In its first interpretation of a statute,
a court endeavors to divine the legislative intent of the Congress responsi-
ble for passing the legislation. :"' This initial act of judicial power is
consistent with the role assigned to the judiciary in the Constitution.282
After that first interpretation, however, the court revisits its prior construc-
tion and discovers that its initial interpretation of the intent of the enacting
legislature was incorrect.283 The court nevertheless is unwilling to correct
that interpretation because Congress has not acted in the wake of the
277. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 1.
278. For a particularly stark example of this view, see Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law
Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1985) (finding that the Constitution prohibits the
courts from making law and that courts must therefore adhere strictly to Congressional intent in
construing a statute).
279. See William N. Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1499
(1987). Eskridge argues that the power to make common law is consistent with the Framer's view of
the separation of powers, a view which tolerated shared lawmaking power, but not concentrated
lawmaking power.
280. See id. at 1501 n.88 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton)) ("The courts must
declare the sense of the law; and if they should be disposed to exercise WILL instead of JUDGMENT,
the consequence would equally be the substitution of their pleasure to that of the legislative body.").
281. See, e.g., Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 758 (1979); Teamsters v. United States,
431 U.S. 324, 354 n.39 (1977).
282. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domain, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 533 (1983). See also
Oscar Mayer, 441 U.S. at 758.
283. See Marshall, supra note 41, at 186; Grabow, supra note 261, at 741.
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court's erroneous decision.2
When the court "interprets" the inaction of post-enactment Congresses,
the court exceeds the legitimate exercise of its constitutional power. The
conduct of post-enactment Congresses is not germane to the issue of the
intent of the enacting Congress. The Congress or Congresses that do not
act to correct a court decision are not the same Congress that enacted the
statute.285 The Supreme Court is not even willing to accept the com-
ments of legislators after the enactment of a statute as evidence of the
enacting Congress' intent.286 The Court has found that "the views of a
subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an
earlier one. '287 Indeed, although it is easy to identify the Congress which
enacted the initial legislation and even easy to identify expressed post-
enactment statements, it is virtually impossible to identify the Congress,
Congresses or legislators which have not passed corrective legislation.
Thus, the court purports to administer the intent of a series of diffuse
Congresses which apparently have expressed their intent through their
silence after the enactment. Therefore, when the court presumes congres-
sional intent from congressional inaction, it fails to interpret the intent of
the Congress which enacted the statute.
Moreover, under the theory of legislative acquiescence, the court
purposefully gives more power to the inaction of post-enactment Congress-
es than it does to the intent of the enacting Congress. The doctrine
presumes that the court has discovered that its prior interpretation of a
statute is incorrect. Yet, the court is willing to maintain that clearly
erroneous interpretation of the intent of the enacting Congress merely
because post-enactment Congresses have failed to act.288
Judges and scholars long have disagreed about the proper balance of
power between the legislature and the judiciary.289 No matter where one
284. See Marshall, supra note 41.
285. See, e.g., Runyan v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 174 n.1 1 (1976).
286. See, eg., Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984); Regional Rail Reorganization Act
Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 132 (1974).
287. Andrus v. Shell Oil Co., 446 U.S. 657, 666 n.8 (1980) (quoting United States v. Price, 361
U.S. 304, 313 (1960)). See also United States v. Clark, 445 U.S. 23, 33 n.9 (1980).
288. Professor Marshall states: "It is downright silly for a court that takes this stand with respect
to rather contemporaneous and explicit post-enactment history to afford extraordinary significance to
far removed and ambiguous inaction." Marshall, supra note 41, at 193-94.
289. See, e.g., JESsE H. CHOPER, JUDICiAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS (1980);
Martin H. Redish, Federal Common-law, Political Legitimacy, and the Interpretive Process: An
"Institutional" Perspective, 83 Nw. U. L. Rnv. 761 (1989); Steven D. Smith, Why Should Courts Obey
the Law?, 77 GEO. L.J. 113 (1988).
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strikes that balance, it is indisputable that the Constitution does not
empower the federal courts to apply a congressional statute in a manner
that is knowingly contrary to the intent of the legislature which enacted the
statute. That is precisely the effect of the theory of legislative acquies-
cence.
3. The Theory of Congressional Acquiescence Provides No Evidentiary
or Constitutional Foundation for the Judicial Perpetuation of the
Section 10(b) Private Remedy
The Supreme Court has acknowledged 2. and recent scholarship has
confirmed2 9 that Congress, when it enacted section 10(b) in 1934, did
not intend to create or to have the courts create a private right of action for
damages. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has suggested that since at least
1975, Congress, by its inaction, has manifested its acquiescence in a long
line of court decisions approving the private remedy.292
The evidence of congressional approval of the private remedy seems
particularly strong because Congress has revisited the federal securities laws
on many occasions without "correcting" the judicial creation of the private
remedy. Since the recognition of private recovery under section 10(b),
Congress has considered and passed ten major legislative amendments to
the 1934 Act.293 When Congress passed the Insider Trading and Securities
290. See, e.g., Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employer's Trust Ins. of Wausau, 113 S. Ct. 2085,2088
(1993); Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773, 2780 (1991) (stating
that the Supreme Court has "made no pretense that it was Congress' design to provide the remedy
afforded"); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730, 737 (1975).
291. Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42 STAN.
L. REV. 385 (1990).
292. See Herman & Maclean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 384-85 (1983). In Huddleston, the
Court supported the cumulative use of the implied section 10(b) remedy with express securities law
remedies by arguing that "when Congress comprehensively revised the securities laws in 1975, a
consistent line of judicial decisions had permitted plaintiffs to sue under § 10(b) regardless of the
availability of express remedies.... Congress' decision to leave § 10(b) intact suggests that Congress
ratified the cumulative nature of the § 10(b) action." Id. at 384. The Securities Act Amendments of
1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97, were the "most substantial and significant revisions of this
country's Federal Securities laws since the passage of the Securities Exchange Act in 1934." Hearings
on S. 249 Before the Subcommittee on Securities of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 1 (1975). The conference report to the 1975 Amendments claimed
that they were the product of "the most searching reexaminations of the competitive, statutory, and
economic issues facing The Securities Markets, the securities industry, and, of course, public investors,
since the 1930's." H.R. REP. No. 229, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 91 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N.
179, 322.
293. The major revisions of the 1934 Act during the period 1968 to the present, are:
1. Williams Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (codified as amended in scattered
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Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988,294 (the 1988 Act) it even preserved all
"implied" remedies under the 1934 Act. Most recently, in 1991, when
Congress enacted section 27A of the 1934 Act reinstating statute of
limitations periods for section 10(b), it specifically referred to the section
10(b) private remedy.295
By the time Congress amended the securities laws in 1988 and certainly
by the time it added section 27A to the 1934 Act in 1991, the "consensus"
in the lower federal courts concerning section 10(b)'s private remedy was
"old" and "overwhelming." '296 According to the Supreme Court, "the fact
that a comprehensive reexamination and significant amendment of [a
statute] left intact the statutory provisions under which the federal courts
had implied a cause of action is itself evidence that Congress affirmatively
sections of 15 U.S.C.) (regulating tender offers);
2. Williams Act Amendment of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-567, 84 Stat. 1497 (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1988)) (giving SEC regulatory authority under § 14(e) to define and proscribe
fraudulent practices);
3. Securities Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (providing for national market system for securities; provisions related
to self-regulation of exchanges, municipal securities, regulation of clearing agencies and transfer agents);
4. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (regulating the activities of issuers who engage in foreign corrupt
practices);
5. Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (increasing sanctions against insider trading);
6. Government Securities Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-571, 100 Stat. 3208 (codified in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C. and 31 U.S.C.) (providing for regulation of broker-dealers in government
securities);
7. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat.
4677 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (providing private right of action based on
contemporaneous insider trading);
8. Penny Stock Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 101-429, 181 Stat. 931 (codified in scattered sections of
15 U.S.C.) (regulating penny stock issuers and dealers);
9. Market Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-432, 104 Stat. 963 (codified in scattered sections
of 12 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.) (permitting SEC to suspend trading for protection of investors and to limit
practices which result in market volatility); and
10. Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (codified as 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-l) (special statute of
limitations provision for cases filed pre-Lampj).
294. 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1 (1988).
295. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-1 (Supp. IV 1992).
296. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 380 (1982). The
Supreme Court in Curran suggests that the consensus regarding the private remedy under the
Commodities Exchange Act was not so "old" or so "overwhelming" as that under section 10(b). That
the Court was willing to infer the Congressional intent to create the private Commodities Exchange Act
remedy suggests that afortiori it would do so in the context of section 10(b).
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intended to preserve that remedy." '297
Moreover, contrary to the notion that Congress is unaware of, or
uninterested in, Supreme Court decisions interpreting its statutes, the
legislative history of both the 1988 Act and section 27A indicates a
congressional preoccupation with such decisions. The legislative history
of the 1988 Act is replete with references to Supreme Court decisions
limiting the reach of congressional legislation designed to prevent insider
trading.298 The history indicates that Congress intended to codify a
theory of liability for misappropriating material non-public information, a
theory which the Supreme Court had discussed, but never approved.299
Similarly, when Congress enacted section 27A of the 1934 Act, it was
plainly aware of the Supreme Court's decision in Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind,
Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson3" which created a uniform, retroactive
statute of limitations period for section 10(b) actions. Congress not only
enacted section 27A in direct response to the Supreme Court's Lampf
decision, it actually incorporated that decision and the date on which Lampf
was rendered as terms in the legislation itself.30' This legislative activity
297. Curran, 456 U.S. at 381-82 (holding that the congressional revisitation of the Commodity
Exchange Act without altering the provision from which the courts had implied a private remedy
indicates the congressional intent to maintain that remedy).
298. H.R. REP. No. 910, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6043
[hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 910].
299. The legislative history mentions the case of Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987),
in which the Supreme Court divided 4-4 on the merits of the misappropriation theory. H.R. REP. No.
910, supra note 298, at 10.
300. 111 S. Ct. 2773, 2780 (1991).
301. See 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-I (Supp. IV 1992). That section provides:
Special provision relating to statute of limitations on private causes of action.
(a) Effect on pending causes of action. The limitation period for any private civil action
implied under section 78j(b) of this title that was commenced on or before June 19,
1991, shall be the limitations period provided by the laws applicable in the jurisdiction,
including principles of retroactivity, as such laws existed on June 19, 1991.
(b) Any private civil action implied under section 78j(b) of this title that was commenced
on or before June 19, 1991 -
(1) which was dismissed as time barred subsequent to June 19, 1991, and
(2) which would have been timely filed under the limitation period provided by the laws
applicable in the jurisdiction, including principles of retroactivity, as such laws existed
on June 19, 1991, shall be reinstated on motion by the plaintiff not later than 60 days
after December 19, 1991.
In fact, section 27A was so responsive to the Supreme Court's Lampfdecision that it has been
challenged-albeit with limited success-as an unconstitutional effort by Congress to overturn a
Supreme Court decision. Compare Brichard Securities Litigation, 788 F. Supp. 1098, 1106-07 (N.D.
Cal. 1992) with Henderson v. Scientific-Atlanta Inc., 971 F.2d 1567 (11 th Cir. 1992) and Johnston v.
Cigna Corp., 789 F. Supp. 1098, 1100 (D. Colo. 1992) and Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. First
Repulicbank Corp., 806 F. Supp. 108 (N.D. Tex. 1992).
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indicates congressional awareness of key Supreme Court decisions affecting
securities fraud.
If the 1988 Act and section 27A are considered revisitations of the 1934
Act, then the case for congressional approval of the private remedy appears
particularly strong. The Supreme Court has endorsed the view that when
Congress adopts a new law incorporating portions of a prior law, it
"normally can be presumed to have had knowledge of the interpretation
given to the incorporated law."3" This presumption seems to apply to
the section 10(b) private remedy.
Even this relatively strong evidence of congressional acquiescence in the
section 10(b) private remedy, however, cannot support a legitimate
inference of congressional approval of that remedy. The language of the
1988 Act and section 27A cannot independently support the legislative
creation of the private remedy. The 1988 Act expressly preserves "the
availability of any cause of action implied" from a provision of the 1934
Act.3 3 Section 27A goes further and reinstates statute of limitations
periods for "any private civil action implied under" section 10(b). 304 This
language certainly evidences congressional awareness that private civil
actions have been implied under section 10(b).
The 1988 Act also arguably evidences the congressional intent that the
courts should not construe the 1988 Act in a manner which would limit any
cause of action implied under the 1934 Act. Section 27A further indicates
the congressional desire that any section 10(b) private action filed before
the Supreme Court's Lampf decision be governed by the statute of
limitations period applicable to that action prior to Lampf.3 5  Yet,
nowhere in these provisions is there an express creation of a private remedy
for damages for section 10(b) violations.
The strongest argument that Congress has affirmatively enacted such a
remedy is based on reading section 27A together with section 10(b). The
argument is that in the 1934 Act, as amended, Congress created a
prohibition against fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of
securities 3"6 and a statute of limitations period for any implied right of
302. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353,382 n.66 (citing Lorillard
v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580-81 (1978)). See also Don E. Williams Co. v. Commissioner, 429 U.S. 569,
576 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 414 n.8 (1975); NLRB v. Gullett Gin Co.,
340 U.S. 361, 366 (1951); National Lead Co. v. United States, 252 U.S. 140, 147 (1920).
303. 15 U.S.C. § 78t-l(d) (1988).
304. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-I (Supp. IV 1992).
305. Id.
306. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988).
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action for violations of that prohibition.3 7  The combination of these two
affirmative legislative enactments leads to the conclusion that Congress has
created a private right of action for damages.
Although this argument has some superficial appeal, it is not persuasive.
Section 27A by itself does not create a statute of limitations period for
section 10(b) actions. 30 8  Both the House and the Senate considered
various proposals for a uniform federal statute of limitations period, but
those proposals were rejected.3 9 Congress instead settled on a piece of
legislation that applies only to section 10(b) actions filed before June 19,
1991.310 As to those actions filed before June 19, 1991, the legislation
merely reinstates the circuit-by-circuit, judicially-created statute of
limitations principles in place at that time.31t As drafted, section 27A is
307. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-l (Supp. IV 1992).
308. Ironically, the Supreme Court in Musick found in section 27A the congressional intent to have
the courts and not Congress flesh out the contours of section 10(b) liability. Musick, Peeler & Garrett
v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 113 S. Ct. 2085, 2089 (1993). By this logic, the Court acknowledged
that Section 27A enacts no limitations period at all. Id.
309. On July 23, 1991, Senator Richard Bryan introduced Senate bill 1533, entitled the Investor
Protection Act of 1991. The bill overturned the retroactive effect of Lampfand, as ultimately drafted,
created a prospective, uniform statute of limitations period for section 10(b) actions which required such
actions to be filed within two years of discovery of the violation, but no longer than five years from
the challenged transaction. This bill was approved by the Senate Banking Committee on August 2,
1991. The House of Representatives drafted a similar bill (H.R. 3185, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991))
which created a uniform limitations period requiring section 10(b) actions to be filed within three years
of discovery and five years of the challenged transaction.
On October 2, 1991 then-chairman of the SEC, Richard Breeden, testified before the Securities
Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs. He acknowledged
the claims of various lobby groups that private actions under the federal securities laws should be
broadly reformed, but he argued that such reform should not take the form of a harsh statute of
limitations period. To Establish a Statute of Limitations for Private Rights of Action Arising From a
Violation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: Hearings on S. 1533 Before the Subcomm. on
Securities of the Comm. on Banking. Housing, and Urban Affairs, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. 13 (1991)
(statement of Richard Breeden, Chairman, SEC) [hereinafter Hearings]. He insisted that private actions
were necessary to preserve the integrity of the securities markets and to compensate defrauded investors.
Id.
On November 14, 1991, however, the Bush Administration informed the Senate Banking Committee
that it would not accept any legislation extending the statute of limitations period for private actions
unless that legislation included sweeping reforms of those actions. White House Specifies Reforms It
Wants in Return for Supporting Lampf Proposal, BNA SEC. L. DAILY Nov. 21, 1991.
Ultimately, Congress rejected Senator Bryan's bill, Chairman Breeden's testimony and the
President's proposed reforms. Instead, Congress merely passed as an amendment to the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, § 476, 105 Stat. 2236 (1991)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-I (Supp. IV 1992)), a stop-gap provision which eliminates the retroactive
effect of the Supreme Court's Lampf decision.
310. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-I (Supp. IV 1992).
311. Id.
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narrowly designed to remove some of the harsh retroactive effects of the
Supreme Court's Lampf decision."' Section 27A does not affirmatively
establish any statute of limitations period. Nor did Congress, when it
enacted section 10(b), intend to create a private remedy for damages."'
If neither section 10(b) nor section 27A independently create a private
remedy, then the two provisions in tandem cannot create that remedy.
In addition, when Congress passed the 1988 Act and section 27A, it did
not affirmatively "reenact" the 1934 Act in any significant sense.314
Instead, these provisions are both portions of different public statutes which
have been added to section 78 of the United States Code. 5  In passing
those provisions, Congress did not enact new legislation which repeats
either the entire 1934 Act or section 10(b). Because Congress has never
affirmatively reenacted section 10(b) in the wake of the "old" or "over-
whelming" consensus favoring the private remedy, Congress has never
exercised its legislative power to create that remedy.
Finally, that some members of Congress have shown their awareness of
court decisions narrowing insider trading liability and imposing a
retroactive statute of limitations period for implied section 10(b) actions
cannot provide any evidentiary basis for congressional acquiescence in the
judicially-created section 10(b) private remedy. The relatively prompt
congressional reaction to these court decisions is narrowly tailored to the
decisions themselves. In the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud
Enforcement Act of 1988, Congress intended to codify a theory presented
in the Supreme Court decisions while in section 27A, Congress intended
narrowly to remove only the retroactive application of the Supreme Court's
Lampf decision. The promptness and precision with which Congress
amended its securities statutes in the wake of these Supreme Court
decisions lends credence to the suggestion that the absence of such prompt
312. Id.
313. See, e.g., Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773, 2780
(1991).
314. The term "reenactment" refers precisely to the affirmative congressional act of enacting a new
statute which incorporates most, but typically not all, of a prior statute. Congress has not reenacted
the 1934 Act. As with the 1974 amendments at issue in The Commodities Exchange Act in Curran,
Congress merely added language without "actively readopting the terms that were left unchanged."
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 403 n.l1 (1982) (distinguishing
reenactment cases such as Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580-81 (1978)). See also Robert C. Brown,
Regulations, Reenactment, and the Revenue Acts, 54 HARv. L. REv. 377 (1941).
315. The Insider Trading and Securities Enforcement Act of 1988, 15 U.S.C. § 781-1 (1988), is Pub.
L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677. Section 27A is Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 and is a small
portion of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991.
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and precise action indicates congressional approval of other Supreme Court
decisions.
Even in this context, however, Congress has not exercised its legislative
power to create a private remedy. The existence of that remedy still
depends on the theory of legislative acquiescence. Having revisited its
securities laws to add a private remedy for victims of insider trading" 6
and to vitiate the retroactive effect of the Supreme Court's statute of
limitations period for section 10(b) actions,3"7 Congress had a golden
opportunity to create an express right of action for damages under section
10(b). Nonetheless, Congress failed to create such an express remedy. Its
inaction could evidence resistance to such a remedy as much as it could
indicate its approval of the judicial creation of that remedy.3" 8 Thus, the
inferences that can be drawn from Congress' failure to enact legislation
expressly rejecting the section 10(b) private remedy are at best inconclu-
sive.
However, as has been demonstrated, even if the Supreme Court could
safely infer congressional approval of that remedy from congressional
inaction, the Constitution does not permit it to do so. Congress cannot
enact legislation by its inaction. The Court admits its awareness that the
Congress which enacted section 10(b) intended no such private remedy.
To continue to recognize the section 10(b) private right of action, therefore,
is to elevate the inaction of post-enactment Congresses above the
acknowledged contrary intent of the enacting Congress. Thus, when the
Court perpetuates the section 10(b) private remedy, it unconstitutionally
fosters a knowingly erroneous interpretation and application of congressio-
nal intent.
IV. THE UNFORTUNATE CONSEQUENCES OF THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL
EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL POWER
The Supreme Court's decisions interpreting the elements of section
10(b) demonstrate the deleterious consequences of the unconstitutional
316. 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1 (1988).
317. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-I (Supp. IV 1992).
318. The Supreme Court has endorsed this inference. "The presumption that a remedy was
deliberately omitted from a statute is strongest when Congress has enacted a comprehensive legislative
scheme including an integrated system of procedures for enforcement." Northwest Airlines, Inc. v.
Transport Workers, 451 U.S. 77, 97 (1981). See also Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National
Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1981); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568 (1979);
National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974).
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exercis6 of judicial power. When a federal court creates and defines the
elements of a private right of action, it naturally gains little guidance from
the intent of the Congress which enacted the legislation.31 9 Absent any
such' guidance, the court necessarily interprets the remedy on its own,
embarking on a "lawless" act of "imagining.
320
Freed of its legislative moorings, the Supreme Court has been guided in
its decisions construing section 10(b) by its distaste for the existence of the
private remedy and by its desire to protect defendants from liability. In
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,32" ' for example, the Supreme
Court based its decision denying section 10(b) standing to mere offerees of
securities upon the uncertain origins of the private remedy:
When we deal with private action under Rule 1Ob-5, we deal with a judicial
oak which has grown from little more than a legislative acorn .... It is
therefore proper that we consider ... what may be described as policy
considerations when we come to flesh out the portions of the law."
The Court further decided that, "[g]iven the peculiar blend of legislative,
administrative, and judicial history which now surrounds Rule 1Ob-5, we
believe that practical factors ... are entitled to a good deal of weight."3"
The so-called practical policy reason for the Court's restriction of section
10(b) liability was the defendants' concern for the "danger of vexatious
litigation which could result from a widely expanded class of plaintiffs
under Rule 10b-5."324  The Court acknowledged that in fashioning its
limitation on section 10(b) liability, it did not dismiss as a "factor" that its
result "makes it easier, rather than more difficult, for a defendant to obtain
a summary judgment."3" The justification for the Court's desire to
protect defendants from liability was the uncertain judicial origin of the
private remedy.326
Similarly, in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,327 the Court's transparent
dissatisfaction with the existence of the section 10(b) private action drove
319. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 742-43 (1979) (Powell, I., dissenting).
320. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773,2783 (1991) (Scalia,
J., concurring). See also Cannon, 441 U.S. at 744 (Powell, J., dissenting); Tennessee Valley Auth. v.
Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194-95 (1978).
321. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
322. Id. at 737.
323. Id. at 749.
324. Id. at 740.
325. Id. at 742.
326. Id. at 762 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
327. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
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its rejection of any such action based on allegations of mere negli-
gence.328 The Court argued that because it was dealing with a "judicially
implied liability," the statutory language, which seemed to require
intentional misconduct, foreclosed "further inquiry." '29  Whereas the
Court in Blue Chip Stamps argued that the judicial origins of the section
10(b) private remedy justified its reliance on policy considerations, the
Court in Hochfelder argued that those origins require strict adherence to the
statutory language.
Nonetheless, the Hochfelder Court contended that the unique role of the
section 10(b) remedy within the federal securities laws also supported its
denial of that remedy for negligent conduct.33 After observing that the
express remedies created by the federal securities laws carry express
procedural restrictions not present in the context of the implied section
10(b) remedy, the Court concluded: "We think these procedural limitations
indicate that the judicially created private damages remedy under section
1 0(b) which has no comparable restrictions cannot be extended, consistently
with the intent of Congress, to actions premised on negligent wrongdo-
ing."33' According to the Court's reasoning, because recovery under the
express remedies of the securities laws is subject to express procedural
requirements, recovery under the implied section 10(b) remedy should at
least be subject to implied substantive limitations.
Based on dubious logic, this argument can be seen as the product of the
Court's fundamental dislike for the section 10(b) implied remedy and the
desire to limit its use. Indeed, Hochfelder cited Blue Chip Stamps with
approval for its "concern that the inexorable broadening of the class of
plaintiff who may sue in this area of the law will ultimately result in more
harm than good." '332
The Supreme Court also based its decision in Lampf3 33 to create a
uniform, retroactive statute of limitations period for private section 10(b)
actions on the uncertain judicial origins of those actions. There, the Court
328. Id. at 193.
329. Id. at 200-01.
330. Id. at 208-12.
331. Id. at 210. Ironically, one of the procedural barriers not present in section 10(b) actions cited
by the Court, is the relatively short statute of limitations period governing the express rights of action.
425 U.S. at 210 n.29. The irony, of course, is that the Supreme Court in Lampf created a uniform
statute of limitations period for section 10(b) actions based on the limitations periods for those express
rights of action. I11 S. Ct. at 2780.
332. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 214 n.33 (quoting Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 747-48).
333. 111 S. Ct. 2773 (1991).
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complained that its task in defining the section 10(b) limitations period was
"awkward" and "complicated by the nontraditional origins of the section
10(b) cause of action." '334 Justice Scalia agreed that the case presented
a "distinctive difficulty because it involves one of those so-called 'implied'
causes of action that, for several decades, this Court was prone to discover
in-or, more accurately, create in reliance upon-federal legislation.""33
Because, as Justice Scalia frankly acknowledged, the Court was "imagin-
ing," it established a retroactive limitations period limiting the effectiveness
of the section 10(b) remedy.336
The uncertainty surrounding the origins of the section 10(b) private right
of action not only drives the Court's interpretations of the elements of that
action, it also produces result-oriented decision-making. With limited
exception,337 the Supreme Court has restricted the scope of the section
10(b) private remedy in each of its decisions interpreting the elements of
that remedy.338 The Court has not been reticent in those decisions about
its desire to protect defendants from securities fraud litigation.339 In
doing so, the Court has created the unfortunate perception that it is
engaging in "preternatural solicitousness for corporate well-being" and
"callousness toward the investing public." 340
V. MUSICK: TWO CONSTITUTIONAL WRONGS MAKE A RIGHT TO
CONTRIBUTION
The Supreme Court's decision in Musick to recognize an implied right
to contribution under section 10(b) not only exemplifies, but also
compounds the unconstitutional exercise of judicial power. The Court
334. Id. at 2779.
335. Id. at 2783 (Scalia, J., concurring).
336. Id.
337. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988); Herman & Maclean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S.
375 (1983). In those rare cases in which the Supreme Court has not limited the reach of the section
10(b) private remedy, it has suggested that the origins of that remedy are rooted in legislative
acquiescence rather than judicial power. In Huddleston, the Court justified its cumulative construction
of the federal securities law remedies by arguing that "Congress ratified the cumulative nature of the
§ 10(b) action." Huddleston, 459 U.S. at 386. Similarly, when the Court in Basic defined materiality
for section 10(b) actions and upheld the district courts' discretion to certify a section 10(b) class action
based on a rebuttable presumption of reliance, it suggested that "legislative acquiescence" was the basis
of the private action. Basic, 485 U.S. at 230-31.
338. See supra notes 321-36 and accompanying text.
339. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 739, 742; Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 214 n.33; Lampf,
I I I S. Ct. at 2779-80.
340. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 762 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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acknowledged that the underlying section 10(b) private remedy derives
from a "theory" of judicial power to "supplement statutory duties" rather
than a theory of congressional intent.34t  The Court further acknowledged
that under its own precedent, the creation of rights of action "ought to be
left to the legislature, not the courts."342 This is yet another recognition
by the Supreme Court that the "theory" of judicial power which gave birth
to the section 10(b) private remedy is no longer sound.343
As has been made clear, however, the section 10(b) implied right of
action is based on more than a discarded "theory"; it is based on the
unconstitutional exercise of the federal judicial power.3" Rather than
confront the constitutional propriety of the section 10(b) private remedy,
the Court, true to form, assumed the remedy's existence for purposes of
interpreting its scope.345 The Court based its decision to recognize an
implied right to contribution under section 10(b) on the very fact that the
private remedy is a judicial creation. The Court suggested that but for the
judicial origins of the section 10(b) private remedy, the Court would follow
its recent precedents rejecting implied rights to contribution under
comparable346 federal regulatory schemes.347  Despite the section 10(b)
private action's inconsistency with the Court's decisions rejecting such
actions absent congressional intent,34 the Court believed that it "must
341. Musick, 113 S. Ct. at 2088 (noting that a search for Congressional intent to create the right
would be "futile").
342. Id. (citing Universities Research Ass'n, Inc. v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754,770 (1981); Transamerica
Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15-16 (1979); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442
U.S. 560, 575-77 (1979)).
343. See Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 575-77; Lampf, 111 S. Ct. at 2783 (Scalia, J., concurring).
344. See infra part III.
345. Once again, the issue of federal "arising under" jurisdiction over the section 10(b) private
remedy was not present in the case because the initial claims were brought under the express statutory
remedies of the 1933 Act, thereby creating supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' implied section
10(b) claim, and the insurance companies' contribution claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1988).
346. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451 U.S. 77 (1981) (holding that employer has
no right to contribution against unions alleged to be joint participants with the employer in violations
of the Equal Pay Act of 1963 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Texas Indus. v. Radcliff
Materials, Inc. 451 U.S. 630 (1981) (holding no right to contribution for recovery, based on section I
of the Sherman Act).
347. Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 113 S. Ct. 2085, 2088 (1993). The
argument against the creation of a federal common-law right to contribution from the Court's recent
cases "would have much force were the duty to be created one governing conduct subject to liability
under an express remedial provision fashioned by Congress, or one governing conduct not already
subject to liability through private suit." Id.
348. Id.
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confront the law in its current form,"3 49 in the "present context, 350 and
in the "present state of the jurisprudence we consider here."35' It is the
unique judicial origin of the private section 10o(b) remedy which, the Court
reasoned, gave it the judicial power to define "the contours" '352 of the
remedy by creating a right to contribution.353
The Court's reasoning, however, confounds logic and constitutional
principles. The Court asserts that because the section 10(b) private right of
action has questionable judicial origins, the federal courts may exercise
more power than otherwise proper to create an additional right of action for
contribution. The Court acknowledges that in situations in which the
federal courts properly interpret and apply private remedies expressly
created by Congress, the courts have no constitutional power to expand
their jurisdiction by creating a federal common-law right to contribu-
tion.354 The Court argues, however, that because the federal courts first
exceeded their constitutional power by creating an underlying cause of
action for the violation of a federal statute, they may further exceed their
constitutional power by creating an additional private right to contribution.
This reasoning is simply a sophisticated version of the argument that "two
wrongs make a right." The initial constitutional error in creating a section
10(b) private remedy is used to justify a second constitutional error in
creating a section 10(b) right to contribution.
Apparently cognizant of the logical and constitutional flaws in this
argument, the Supreme Court attempted to support its newly-created section
10(b) right to contribution by appealing alternatively to legislative
acquiescence.355 The Court contended that recent congressional "refer-
ences" to the section 10(b) private right of action356 indicated not only
congressional approval of that action, but also a broad delegation of power
to the judiciary over its formulation.357 The Court's reliance on legisla-
tive acquiescence, however, is unavailing.
349. Id. at 2089.
350. Id.
351. Id. at 2088.
352. Id. at 2089 (citing Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, I11 S. Ct. 2749 (1991)).
353. Id. at 2091.
354. Id. at 2088 (citing with approval Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 77; Texas Industries, 451 U.S.
at 630).
355. Musick, 113 S. Ct. at 2089 (citing Herman & Maclean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 384-86
(1983); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 378-82 (1982)).
356. Musick, 113 S. Ct. at 2089 (citing the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act
of 1988, 15 U.S.C. § 781-2 (1988), and § 27A of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-I (Supp, IV 1992)).
357. Musick, 113 S. Ct. at 2089 ("That task, it would appear, Congress has left to us.').
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As has been shown, legislative acquiescence is never a valid basis for the
judicial creation of a private statutory remedy.35 8 The theory of legisla-
tive acquiescence is based on unfounded assumptions about congressional
inaction.359 More significantly, the theory upsets the constitutionally
mandated separation of legislative and judicial power; it permits the
judiciary to treat congressional inaction as a legislative enactment and to
maintain a knowingly erroneous interpretation of the intent of the enacting
Congress.3 60 Even in the context of the legislative responses to the
judicial interpretations of section 10(b), legislative acquiescence provides
no legitimate constitutional basis for maintaining the private right of action
in the face of the contrary intent of the enacting Congress."' t
When the Court in Musick employed the theory of legislative acquies-
cence to justify its power to create a right to contribution, it once again
compounded these constitutional difficulties. The Court inferred from
congressional "references" to section 10(b) not just congressional approval
of a court decision, but a broad congressional delegation of judicial power
to continue to fashion the section 10(b) remedy, including the power to
fashion additional rights of action such as those for contribution.
The Court's interpretation of congressional "references" to section 10(b),
however, lacks support. The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud
Enforcement Act of 1988 preserves "implied remedies"; it does not
expressly or implicitly delegate any judicial power to the federal
courts. 362  To the contrary, this statute expressly limits the traditional
judicial power to construe statutory remedies in an exclusive manner.63
Similarly, section 27A expressly vitiates the retroactive effect of the
Supreme Court's decision in Lampf to create a uniform statute of
limitations period for section 10(b) claims."6  Contrary to the Court's
inference, this stop-gap provision does not avoid "entangling Congress" in
the formulation of the statute of limitations issue.365 Far from expressly
or implicitly delegating to the judiciary the power to formulate the elements
358. See infra part III.C.
359. See infra part III.C. 1.
360. See infra part Ill.C.2.
361. See supra notes 293-95 and accompanying text.
362. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-A (1988).
363. Id.
364. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-l (Supp. IV 1992).
365. See Musick, 113 S. Ct. at 2089. See also supra notes 309-10 and accompanying text, detailing
the congressional debate regarding the statute of limitations.
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of section 10(b), this provision is a flat rejection of the Court's prior
work.366 Any inference that Congress has acquiesced in the Court's
power to formulate section 10(b), therefore, is contrary to fact.
Moreover, any exercise of judicial power based on legislative acquies-
cence is contrary to the Constitution. When a court uses legislative
acquiescence as a basis for statutory construction, it unconstitutionally
maintains an erroneous interpretation of the intent of the enacting Congress
merely because of the inaction of subsequent, non-enacting Congresses. In
Musick, this constitutional error is magnified. There, the Court did not, and
could not, argue that legislative acquiescence supports the right to
contribution because there is no clear judicial authority or line of authority
recognizing that implied right.3 67  Instead, the Court asserted that
Congress has acquiesced in its power to decide such matters as whether to
create an implied right to contribution under section 10(b).161 The Court
assumed that neither section 10(b) nor the general congressional grant of
"arising under" subject matter jurisdiction,3 69 expressly or impliedly
confers this power on the federal courts.70 Nonetheless, because the
federal courts have exercised that power and because Congress has not
acted to remove that power, the Court inferred that Congress approves of
the judicial use of that power. 7' Once again, this argument improperly
elevates the inaction of non-enacting Congresses over the intent of the
enacting Congress.
Even if Congress by its silence had acquiesced in an expansion of federal
judicial power beyond that contemplated in section 10(b) or in the general
grants of federal subject matter jurisdiction, the federal courts could not
consistent with the Constitution accept that power. The Constitution grants
to Congress the sole authority to create the lower federal courts and to
assign to them subject matter jurisdiction.372 Congress can only create
the lower federal courts and assign to them subject matter jurisdiction
through the legislative process.3 3 Congress cannot, by its inaction,
366. Indeed, Congress' legislative rejection of the Supreme Court's Lamnpfdecision is so obvious
that it has been challenged as an unconstitutional attempt to overrule a Supreme Court decision. See,
e.g., In re Birchard Securities Litigation, 788 F. Supp. 1089, 1106-07 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
367. Musick, 113 S. Ct. at 2086.
368. Id. at 2089.
369. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988).
370. Musick, 113 S. Ct. at 2089.
371. Id.
372. See U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 1; art. I, § 8.
373. See U.S. CONsT. art I, § 7.
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delegate judicial power to the lower federal courts.374 The Constitution
prohibits the federal courts from accepting judicial power not delegated by
an act of Congress.375 Accordingly, the Supreme Court cannot permit the
federal courts to accept judicial power absent such a delegation.376
Congress, therefore, cannot by its acquiescence delegate federal judicial
power. Thus, the Musick Court's reliance on legislative acquiescence to
support its view that Congress delegated to the federal courts the judicial
power to create an implied right to contribution flies in the face of settled
principles of constitutional law.
Neither legislative acquiescence nor the unique judicial origins of the
section 10(b) private remedy can authorize the Court to "define the
contours" of that remedy by creating new rights of action.377 When the
federal courts interpret and apply express statutory remedies, they
undoubtedly have the power to define the "contours" or "flesh out" those
remedies.37 But, even the Musick Court acknowledged379 that power
does not extend to the creation of new rights of action.
Furthermore, when determining whether a right to contribution fits within
the "contours" of the implied section 10(b) remedy, the Court expands the
notion of statutory "contours" beyond recognition. It concludes that the
"contours" of section 10(b) are broad enough to encompass a contribution
action.s ° Yet, the Court does not search for the right to contribution
within the "contours" of section 10(b)."' The Court instead infers from
analogous express rights to contribution in the 1934 Act3 2 that Congress,
had it created a section 10(b) private right of action, would have also
created a corresponding right to contribution.383  At this point, however,
the Court is no longer exercising its power to "round out" the scope of
374. See id.
375. See U.S. CoNsT. art. II, §§ 1, 2. See also American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17-
18 (1951).
376. Finn, 341 U.S. at 17-18.
377. Musick, 113 S. CL at 2089.
378. Id. (citing Virginia Bankshares, Inc., v. Sandberg, 111 S. Ct. 2749, 2764 (1991); Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975)). See also Cannon v. University of Chicago,
441 U.S. 677, 745 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("[T]he federal judiciary necessarily exercises
substantial powers to construe legislation, including, when appropriate, the power to prescribe
substantive standards of conduct that supplement federal legislation.').
379. Musick, 113 S. CL at 2088.
380. Id. at 2089.
381. Id.
382. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i, 78r (1988).
383. Musick, 113 S. Ct. at 2089.
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statutory language; instead, it is writing into the federal securities laws a
private right of action for contribution which admittedly is not within the
contours of section 10(b) itself and is not part of the congressional scheme.
The Court's reliance upon the presumed intent of Congress in enacting
the 1934 Act to support its creation of an implied right to contribution is
ironic. The Court initially justifies its power to create the remedy by
arguing that even though Congress in 1934 did not intend to create a
section 10(b) private remedy, post-enactment Congresses have acquiesced
in its power to create and to fill out the contours of the section 10(b)
private action.'14  When the Court fills out those contours, however, it
suddenly returns to the intent of the enacting Congress."' The irony is
that the Court freely acknowledges that the enacting Congress did not
intend to create the section 10(b) private right of action, did not intend to
create any section 10(b) right to contribution, and did not intend to
empower the federal courts to do so.
In light of the dubious logic and constitutional basis for the Musick
decision, the specter of result-oriented reasoning reappears. Unlike most
of its prior decisions limiting the reach of the section 10(b) private action,
the Supreme Court in Musick appears to have extended the scope of that
private action.386 Ultimately, however, all of the Court's arguments in
Musick hinge on its concern for defendants threatened with securities fraud
liability: "Having implied the underlying liability in the first place, to now
disavow any authority to allocate it on the theory that Congress has not
addressed the issue would be most unfair to those against whom damages
are assessed." '387
Hence, in the Supreme Court's previous decisions narrowing the scope
of section 10(b), the Court argues that the unique judicial origins of the
private remedy mandate a limiting construction. 388 In Musick, and to
some extent in Lampf however, the Court argues that the unique judicial
origins of the private remedy mandate the expanded use of judicial power
384. Id. at 2088.
385. Id. at 2089.
386. Most, if not all, of the Supreme Court's recent decisions interpreting section 10(b) limit rather
than expand the scope of the private right of action. See supra notes 321-36 and accompanying text.
387. Musick, 113 S. Ct. at 2088. This is the same sort of fairness argument made by Justice Scalia
in Lampf 111 S. Ct. at 2783. There, Justice Scalia asserted that absent a congressionally mandated
statute of limitations period for section 10(b), "no limitations period exists." But he declined to follow
this principled result, because it would be "highly unjust to those who must litigate past inventions."
Id.
388. See supra notes 321-26 and accompanying text.
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to create a new private action for contribution and a new retroactive
uniform federal limitations period. On the one hand, the judicial origins of
section 10(b) are used to justify a contraction of federal judicial power. On
the other hand, those origins are used to justify an expansion of federal
judicial power.
This inconsistency is not irreconcilable. But the regrettable point of
reconciliation in these section 10(b) decisions is the Court's almost
unwavering protection of defendants threatened with securities fraud
liability. The Court has limited the reach of the section 10(b) private
remedy by arguing that the judicial origins of the remedy give it no power
to expand the congressional scheme. Additionally, it has created a
contribution right and a relatively short retroactive limitations period by
arguing that the judicial origins of that remedy give it special power to do
so. By limiting the reach of section 10(b), by fashioning a short retroactive
limitations period, and by creating a right to contribution, the Court in all
of its significant section 10(b) cases has consistently protected defendants
from securities fraud damages actions.
VI. CONCLUSION: COPING WITH THE ABSENCE OF THE JUDICIALLY-
CREATED SECTION 10(b) PRIVATE REMEDY
The prospect of life without the section 10(b) private remedy no doubt
sends shivers through the spines of securities investors and securities
lawyers. But their fears are unfounded.
Congress would likely respond to the judicial elimination of the private
remedy by creating an express remedy for violations of section 10(b).
Predicting congressional action is hazardous. Yet, when the Supreme Court
in Lampf3 9 created a retroactive statute of limitations period which
effectively destroyed many pending private section 10(b) claims, Congress
quickly responded with legislation vitiating the decision's harsh retroactive
effects.3 90 Congress, however, left for another day legislation addressing
broader policy questions regarding securities fraud litigation.3 91
If Congress' response to Lampfis any guide, Congress would likely react
promptly to the judicial elimination of the private section 10(b) remedy by
creating an amendment to section 10(b) which would simply declare that
any person injured as a result of a violation of section 10(b) may bring an
389. 111 S. Ct. 2773 (1991).
390. See 15 U.S.C. § 27aa-1 (1988).
391. Hearings, supra note 309.
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action for monetary or equitable relief in federal district court. But
Congress might be slower to resolve the broader questions of the elements
of its newly-created private remedy.
Any congressional reaction establishing an express private right of action
for violations of section 10(b), however, would serve the goals of investor
protection more than the current "guerilla warfare" 392 being waged against
the implied right of action. As Justice Kennedy warned in Virginia
Bankshares, "Congress and those charged with enforcement of the
securities laws stand forewarned that unresolved questions concerning the
scope of those causes of action are likely to be answered by the Court in
favor of defendants."393
Even if Congress did not act to restore private remedies for the violation
of section 10(b), however, the costs to investor protection would be
outweighed by the benefits of eliminating the unconstitutional use of
judicial power. Under section 10(b), as currently construed by the federal
courts, purchasers or sellers of securities may recover their out-of-pocket
losses or the defendant's profits only if they bring suit within one year of
discovering the wrong and within three years of a challenged transaction.
Additionally, depending on the circuit, they must prove: (1) scienter 94 or
recklessness;395 (2) a material misstatement396 or a material omission,
provided there was an independent, pre-existing duty to disclose;397 (3)
in connection with (4) the purchase or sale 398 of (5) an instrument which
represents an investment in a common enterprise with profits coming
solely399 or primarily from the efforts of others,40 and (6) the plaintiff
392. Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 111 S. Ct. 2749, 2769 (1991).
393. Id. at 2770 (Kennedy, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). Justice Kennedy was
joined in his views by Justices Stevens, Blackmun, and Marshall.
394. See, eg., Stokes v. Lokken, 644 F.2d 779, 783 (8th Cir. 1981) (stating that intent is required
to sustain civil liability).
395. See, e.g., Hackbart v. Holmes, 675 F.2d 1114, 1117 (10th Cir. 1982) (finding recklessness
standard adequate to satisfy Rule 1 Ob-5 scienter requirement).
396. See, e.g., Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F.2d 1169, 1174-75 (7th Cir.) (noting that a firm may be
silent but may not lie), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 853 (1987).
397. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Josephthal & Co., 814 F.2d 798, 804 (lst Cir. 1987) (conditioning
plaintiff's claim on proof that defendant intended to misrepresent or failed to disclose material fact upon
which plaintiff relied).
398. Crane Co. v. American Standard, Inc., 603 F.2d 244,249 (2d Cir. 1979) (stating that Rule lob.
5 applies generally to activities in connection with purchase or sale of securities).
399. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 423 U.S. 837, 852 (stating that basic test for
distinguishing a security is whether investment scheme contemplates profits to come solely from efforts
of others), reh'g denied, 423 U.S. 884 (1975).
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presumptively,4 t  reasonably," 2  or justifiably, 3  relied upon the
defendant's misstatements or omissions, which (7) caused the plaintiff to
enter the transaction' 4° and (8) caused the plaintiff to suffer losses.05
For defrauded buyers of securities, who may seek express remedies under
section 11406 or section 12(2)1 7 of the Securities Act of 1933 Act
without showing scienter, loss causation, or an independent duty to
disclose, the implied private remedy under section 10(b) has become a
redundant or even relatively unattractive option.
For defrauded sellers of securities who often allege that a nondisclosure
rather than an affirmative misrepresentation induced them to part with their
stock at an unfairly low price, the section 10(b) remedy is not particularly
helpful. Defrauded sellers cannot recover under section 10(b) unless they
can establish that the defendants owed them a pre-existing duty to disclose
material, nonpublic facts.4"' The presence of such a pre-existing
disclosure obligation is rare in impersonal market transactions. The rare
investor who is defrauded by a person who owes them a disclosure
obligation likely will have state law claims for fraud and breach of
fiduciary duty.409
For those remaining defrauded sellers who are induced to sell their
400. See, e.g., SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 483 (5th Cir. 1974) (finding that
appropriate test is whether efforts made by those other than investor are undeniably significant).
401. See Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F.2d 1169, 1174-75 (7th Cir.) (stating that an omission is material
where omitted fact would have assumed actual significance in decisions of reasonable shareholder), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 853 (1987).
402. See, e.g., Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 187 (3d Cir. 1981) (finding facts
withheld were material to reasonable investor), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938 (1982).
403. See, e.g., Zobrist v. Coal-X, Inc., 708 F.2d 1511, 1516 (10th Cir. 1983) (stating that plaintiff
must establish justifiable reliance on false representation).
404. See, e.g., Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 380 (2d Cir. 1974) (requiring
that Rule I Ob-5 claimant show that violations at issue caused plaintiff to engage in transaction), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975).
405. Id. at 381 (conditioning lOb-5 claim on plaintiff's allegation that transaction resulted in loss).
406. 15 U.S.C. § 77K (1988). Section I I provides an express right of action to any person who
acquires a registered security pursuant to a material misstatement or omission on a registration
statement.
407. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1988). Section 12(2) provides an express right of action to any acquiror
of securities against sellers who make material misrepresentations or omission.
408. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 657-58 (1983) (finding that duty to disclose arises from
relationship of parties, not from mere possession of material nonpublic information); Chiarella v. United
States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980) (holding that failure to disclose information violates section 10(b) only
where duty to disclose exists).
409. See Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477-80 (1977); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 80
(1975); MARC J. STEINBERG & RALPH C. FERRARA, SECURITIES PRACTICE: FEDERAL AND STATE
ENFORCEMENT § 12:18 (1985).
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securities by affirmative misrepresentations, the section 10(b) private
remedy supplements the remedies available under section 9,40 section
18(a), 41' and section 27A412 of the 1934 Act, and under the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) treble damages provi-
sions.413 Moreover, in light of the federal courts' restrictions on section
10(b) recovery, state common-law and statutory remedies are also attracting
the attention of defrauded securities sellers. 4
Finally, even if the Supreme Court abandons the section 10(b) private
right of action, a violation of the provision could still provide the basis for
a state law tort action. The state law action would not have independent
federal subject matter jurisdiction, but could still be heard in federal court
where diversity or supplemental jurisdiction is present.
Accordingly, as currently interpreted by the Supreme Court, the implied
right of action under section 10(b) provides the exclusive remedy only for
those sellers of securities who: (1) prove that a defendant's intentional or
reckless misrepresentation of material fact, or failure to disclose a material
fact in breach of a duty to disclose caused their securities losses; (2) file
their claims within three years of the sale and one year of discovery of the
wrong; and (3) would not otherwise be able to recover under the express
remedies provided by the federal securities laws, RICO, state securities
statutes, or the common-law. The Supreme Court and the federal courts
have narrowed the reach of the implied section 10(b) remedy to such a
degree that its complete elimination works a correspondingly narrow
hardship.
The benefits of eliminating the judicially-created private remedy
outweigh this hardship. If the Supreme Court would use the issue of the
propriety of the section 10(b) implied right to announce its intention to "get
410. 15 U.S.C. § 78i (1988). Section 9 prohibits manipulation of securities prices.
411. 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1988). Section 18(a) prohibits material misstatements on filed reports.
412. 15 U.S.C. § 27A (1988). Section 27A allows recovery of profits made by any person trading
on material, nonpublic information.
413. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988). A violation of section 10(b) would constitute a predicate act for
RICO liability purposes, whether or not an independent private right of action for that violation exists.
See Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 112 S. Ct. 1311 (1992).
414. MARC 3. STEINBERG, UNDERSTANDING SEcuRTIEs LAW 133 (1989).
Due to the Supreme Court's decisions in the federal securities law, area which have had the
effect of making a plaintiff's task in establishing a successful cause of action more difficult,
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out of the business '415 of implying rights of action, Congress would
assume its proper burden of deciding whether to create an express right of
action not only for section 10(b) violations, but for violations of all of its
prohibitions. In this regard, the Court's decision to let Congress create its
own remedies would serve the Constitution's required separation of judicial
and legislative power. The policy questions surrounding the proper
remedies for statutory violations would be decided in the legislature and not
in the courts. The courts then would be guided by the language and the
intent of the enacting legislature rather than by the judges' relatively
untethered policy views.
Ironically, the Supreme Court's refusal to recognize implied rights of
action under section 10(b) or under any congressional prohibition would go
a long way toward realizing Blackstone's real vision of judicial power in
a liberal regime. The beauty of the Constitution is that the federal courts
have limited power to remedy the violation of a federal right if, but only
if, the legislature has created the right and the remedy. One lesson from
the unconstitutional judicial creation of the implied section 10(b) remedy
is that if the federal courts can create remedies for judicially-perceived
wrongs without the consent of the governed, they can also eliminate-case
by case-the efficacy of those remedies without the consent of the
governed.
415. See Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 190 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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